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Despite two decades of manned spaceflight development, the recent thrust for increased human exploration
places significant demands on current technology. More information is needed in understanding how human
control affects mission performance and most importantly, how to design support systems that aid in human-
system collaboration. This information on the general human-system relationship is difficult to ascertain due
to the limitations of human performance modeling and the breadth of human actions in a particular situation.
However, cognitive performance can be modeled in limited, well-defined scenarios of human control and the
resulting analysis on these models can provide preliminary information with regard to the human-system re-
lationship. This investigation examines the critical case of lunar Landing Point Redesignation (LPR) as a case
study to further knowledge of the human-system relationship and to improve the design of support systems to
assist astronauts during this task. To achieve these objectives, both theoretical and experimental practices are
used to develop a task execution time model and subsequently inform this model with observations of simulated
astronaut behavior. The experimental results have established several major conclusions. First, the method of
LPR task execution is not necessarily linear, with tasks performed in parallel or neglected entirely. Second,
the time to complete the LPR task and the overall accuracy of the landing site is generally robust to environ-
mental and scenario factors such as number of points of interest, number of identifiable terrain markers, and
terrain expectancy. Lastly, the examination of the overall tradespace between the three main criteria of fuel
consumption, proximity to points of interest, and safety when comparing human and analogous automated
behavior illustrates that humans outperform automation in missions where safety and nearness to points of
interest are the main objectives, but perform poorly when fuel is the most critical measure of performance.
Improvements to the fidelity of the model can be made by transgressing from a deterministic to probablistic
model and incorporating such a model into a six degree-of-freedom trajectory simulator. This paper briefly
summarizes recent technological developments for manned spaceflight, reviews previous and current efforts
in implementing LPR, examines the experimental setup necessary to test the LPR task modeling, discusses
the significance of findings from the experiment, and also comments on the extensibility of the LPR task and
experiment results to human Mars spaceflight.
Nomenclature
α Number of landing sites considered
ε Training parameter
Π Number of Points of interest
B Press/Release button operator
FLA Fuel consumption of Landing Area
H Number of hazards
Mc Choosing operator
Mij Matrix of terrain map color values
Mt Thinking operator
m Number of cells containing max(Mij)
n Number of cells containing min(Mij)
P Pointing operator
p Number of cells containing mode(Mij)
RLA Roughness of Landing Area
r(a,b) Radii of fuel ellipse
SLA Slope of Landing Area
AFM Autonomous Flight Manager
ANOVA Analysis of Variance
ATPL Air Transport Pilot License
CHPM Computational Human Performance Model
DOF Degree of Freedom
DV Dependent Variable
EDGE Engineering DOUG Graphics for Exploration
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EDL Entry, Descent, and Landing
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
HITL Human-in-the-Loop
IFR Instrument Flight Rated
ITM Identifiable Terrain Marker
IV Independent Variable
LED Light Emitting Diode
LEM Lunar Excursion Model
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging
LPD Landing Point Designator
LPR Landing Point Redesignation
MEDS Multifunction Electronic Display System
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PFD Primary Flight Display
POI Points of Interest




SAGAT Situation Awareness Global Assessment Test
SO SAGAT Run Order
VFDE Vehicle Footprint Dispersion Error
VFR Visual Flight Rated
I. Introduction
Since July 16, 1969, a dozen men have been to the surface of the Moon, eighteen people past low Earth orbit (LEO),
and several hundred men and women within Earth’s orbit. While these achievements are laudable, the international
spaceflight efforts aim to expand the reach and capability of human spaceflight programs. Nations such as China1 and
India2 are developing manned spaceflight programs, while programs such as the United States National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) plans to send humans back to the Moon3 and to planets such as Mars.4 To meet
these objectives, new technologies and improved spacecraft system designs are necessary to counter the challenges
posed. One challenge with returning to the Moon is precision landing near points of interest (POI) on the Moon’s
surface. This type of landing is different than the approach used by the Apollo missions, which focused on the task
of safely landing a man on the Moon, within the vicinity of a carefully chosen landing area. The landing areas were
selected based on the limitations of the Apollo lunar lander, which could only reach areas of relatively flat and smooth
terrain on the illuminated side of the Moon. However, the new lunar lander is required to have complete surface
accessibility (both illuminated and shadowed regions) and the capability of landing in hazardous terrain. This lander
performance is expected to be similar for human Mars exploration - but will be more difficult to achieve due to the
limitations in current entry, descent, and landing (EDL) technology.5
Despite the fairly unified agreement on why humans should be sent to the Moon and Mars and the technology
required to achieve this aim, a greater discord exists on the role of the crew during mission phases such as EDL.
Arguments against some form of manned control include increased mission risk, or a desire to fly in fuel- or sensor
performance- optimal conditions,6 or a significant increase in system complexity. Counter-arguments refer to the need
for some level of human control - as a backup/supervisory role to highly automated systems,7 to adapt to unanticipated
circumstances and environments,8 or to make decisions based on real-time data rather than mission-decided logic
precoded prior to launch.9 As Neil Armstrong, celebrated commander of Apollo 11, so colorfully stated, “I [was]
absolutely adamant about my God-given right to be wishy-washy about where I was going to land”.10 Regardless of
party allegiances, the major concern among both groups remains the same: more information is needed in understand-
ing how human control affects mission performance and, most importantly, how to design support systems that aid in
human-system collaboration. This information on the general human-system relationship is difficult to ascertain due
to the limitations of human performance modeling and the breadth of human actions in a particular situation. However,
cognitive performance can be modeled in limited, well-defined scenarios of human control and the resulting analysis
on these models can provide preliminary information with regard to the human-system relationship.
This investigation examines the critical case of lunar Landing Point Redesignation (LPR) as a case study to further
knowledge of the human-system relationship and to improve the design of support systems to assist astronauts during
this task. To achieve these objectives, both theoretical and experimental methods are used to develop a task execution
time model and subsequently inform this model with observations of simulated astronaut behavior. This paper briefly
summarizes recent technological developments for manned spaceflight, reviews previous and current efforts in imple-
menting LPR, examines the experimental setup necessary to test the LPR task modeling, discusses the significance of
findings from the experiment, and also comments on the extensibility of the LPR task and experiment results to human
Mars spaceflight.
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II. Background and Literature Review
A. Manned Spaceflight Development for Earth and Mars
The knowledge base of the level of human control and the design of spacecraft systems is dependent on the maturity
of the current technology and the resulting application. Many studies for each application (ie, targeted planetary
body) have implemented or proposed various technologies to support human control. For example, the Space Shuttle
Orbiter, which routinely traverses to LEO and performs an Earth re-entry, received an upgrade in cockpit display
technology in the mid 1990s. This new cockpit, the Multifunction Electronic Display System (MEDS), or better
known as “glass cockpit”, progresses from the standard monochromatic display to an array of colors and enhanced
graphics. Two identical sets of six displays (one for each astronaut pilot) present more information in a succinct
and efficient manner.11 The tasks and responsibilities of the astronaut pilots has also been examined. Holland and
VanderArk performed a task analysis on the Shuttle entry and landing sequence, documenting the approximate vehicle
conditions at the time of each task.12 While the task analysis assisted in the understanding of the requirements to pilot
the Orbiter, this study did not compare the result of neglecting a critical task. Studies such as these are useful for the
intended application, but are difficult to extend to other scenarios, due to the differences in flight conditions. This
difference is most apparent when comparing Earth and Mars EDL. Mars EDL significantly lags behind Earth re-entry
and Moon landing. Thus far, no manned spacecraft has landed on Mars and the required technology to complete such
a feat has not been flight validated. Recent studies of manned spacecraft to Mars require significantly heavy payloads
(40 - 80 MT), far exceeding the limits of current technology. In comparison, the Mars Science Laboratory, slated
for launch in 2011, is about 1 MT and pushing the limits of Viking era landing technology, the current methodology
for landing on Mars.13 Preliminary concepts have been proposed for landing large payloads to Mars, such as NASA
Design Reference Missions (DRM) which outline the full Earth launch, Mars landing, Earth return.4 Other Mars EDL
investigations have been focused on parametric studies of various architecture elements. Steinfeldt, et al. compared
traditional blunt body and slender body shapes of a variety of entry velocities, masses, and deceleration technologies
to determine the amount of payload that could be landed on Mars.14 Christian, et al. also performed a similar study,
but instead focused on traditional Viking and Apollo heritage designs across a range of initial conditions.15 These
studies, along with other human exploration investigations, explore the design space on the method to send humans
to Mars, but the actual modeling of human impact is fairly limited - at most, G-loading constraints are included as a
factor in EDL trajectory design.
Recent studies of Earth and Mars human EDL applications are largely high-level conceptual investigations. Con-
versely, studies regarding manned lunar landings are predominantly detailed and focused studies. The current effort to
return to the Moon has prompted investigations into the improvement of Apollo-era designs and to incorporate existing
elements of space-rated technology. The LPR task has garnered significant attention, due to the criticality of the task,
the availability of new technology, and the challenge of the current mission objectives. However, appreciation of the
current practice of modeling LPR first requires an understanding of the definition and the history of the task.
B. Landing Point Redesignation
The LPR task, in its most fundamental form, is an opportunity for the astronauts to select a final lunar landing site. The
LPR task is expected to occur during the latter portion of the lunar trajectory, during the powered descent phase (PDP).
In PDP, the lunar module has just performed a braking maneuver, or reverse thrusting of the main descent engines, and
is rapidly decelerating. The vehicle performs a pitch-up maneuver, which places the vehicle in an orientation suitable
for LIght Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) sensor operation.16 This maneuver is expected to occur at approximately 1
km in altitude, at a velocity of 100 m/s (nominal trajectory).17 Figure 116 illustrates this mission sequence.
Soon after vehicle pitch-up, the LIDAR sensor begins to scan the expected landing site. The LPR task begins after
the Autonomous Flight Manager (AFM) displays the results of the LIDAR scan. The AFM serves two purposes: 1)
processing the raw LIDAR sensor data into a form comprehensible to the crew, and 2) from this sensor data, suggesting
alternative landing sites to the a priori baseline site. Up until this point, the only source of terrain information available
to the crew is a window/synthetic camera view. After AFM processing, the crew has the window/synthetic camera
view and the results of the LIDAR scan as sources of terrain information. The crew evaluates the alternative landing
sites, finds a site that satisfies the specified criteria (e.g., safety, fuel efficiency, and nearness to point of interest), and
designates the final landing site, which concludes the LPR task. This exercise can be analogized to common everyday
scenarios, such as determining where to park one’s car. A parking spot located near the targeted location is preferable,
but avoiding collisions or accidental scrapes by other cars is highly desired. Furthermore, the car is rapidly running
out of fuel, so a quick decision is favored to prevent immobility. This analogy is essentially what occurs during lunar
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Figure 1: Powered Descent Phase.16
landing, but the car is the lunar vehicle, the parking spot is a landing site, and the targeted location is a previously
landed asset or a spot of scientific interest. The LPR task generally occurs rather quickly, as the trajectory required
to enable LPR is typically not fuel-optimal. Preliminary analyses estimate 30 seconds for LPR task completion.18 In
this short period of time, the astronauts must absorb information from the AFM and window/synthetic camera view,
perform tradeoffs of safety, fuel, and nearness to the POI, and select a site. Likewise, the crew must adapt to any
unanticipated changes to the terrain.
This current procedure for LPR is different from the landing point selection process utilized during the Apollo
program. Apollo-LPR was strictly a manual task and was not a collaboration between an automated system and the
onboard crew. The astronauts used a reticle-etched window known as the landing point designator (LPD) to determine
the necessary guidance to reach the selected landing site. The site was selected based on the astronaut’s perception
of the landing terrain, as seen from the window. The pilot would align the cross hairs and view the location of the
expected landing site based on readings of the flight computer. The scribe markings are used to retarget the vehicle
and land at the new alternative site.
While the LPD system worked for all Apollo missions, this method of landing point redesignation is dependent on
the viewing angle, lighting conditions, and familiarity with the lunar terrain. A sound lunar lander design can account
for such variations, but there is less control over these parameters. Furthermore, the goals of the Constellation program
are to fly in lunar terrain where visibility is poor and hazardous are numerous.3 The inclusion of the AFM will make
the new lander system more robust to environmental factors and increase the lunar lander capability.
C. Current Efforts in Lunar Landing Development
With the shortcomings of the Apollo methods and over four decades of improved technology, recent studies related
to manned lunar landing have focused on the development of support systems (ie, displays and landing algorithms)
and improved modeling of human performance. There are several key efforts pertinent to this study. The main
investigator of landing algorithms is the Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) team,
led by NASA Johnson Space Center. The ALHAT team is developing the AFM and assisting in the design of the
associated displays to provide situation awareness and task assistance. The AFM is analogous to a Flight Management
System (FMS) - providing guidance, navigation, and control cues,16 monitoring system health,19 and interacting with
the crew, including prompts for supervisory commands.20 The ALHAT team has also provided suggestions for cockpit
display designs,21 in particular, for the primary flight displays and horizontal situation indicator. New technologies
such as Heads-Up Display (HUDs) are considered for relevancy to the lunar landing situation. Another key proposer
of lunar cockpit display designs has been the Altair team. The Altair team, also led by NASA Johnson Space Center,
is tasked with the design of the lunar lander. Recent studies such as the work of Prinzel, et al. have capitalized on the
maturation of technologies such as Highway in the Sky (HITS).22
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Several key studies have focused on various elements of LPR. Forest, et al. developed a landing site selection algo-
rithm that, when given terrain data, would highlight key hazards and suggest alternative sites based on the cost function
preference of the crew. This study provided an initial reference LPR display, but did not model human interaction with
such a system.23 Needham investigated the impact of varying levels of automation on human performance during
LPR, concluding that higher automation allowed for quicker time to complete.24 In addition, Needham developed a
set of icons that would overlay landing site terrain characteristics on a top-down synthetic map. An experiment was
also performed to observe the impact of varying levels of automation. However, the subjects used in this experiment
were graduate students with little piloting experience and not closely representative of astronauts. Sostaric and Rea
modeled the impact of LPR on trajectory design.6 This impact exists primarily in the need for a window viewing angle
and required vehicle divert capability. This study provides initial estimations on the change in metrics (e.g., time to
touchdown, trajectory profile) but only for a high-level concept of LPR; no further commentary on specific human
tasks is provided. Lastly, Chua, et al. have derived a task model and used this model to examine bottlenecks of LPR.25
These bottlenecks were addressed by redesigning the LPR display to simplify the information layout and to utilize new
symbolism to represent site characteristics. This LPR task model also incorporates expert decision-making theory26
to account for specialized astronaut behavior.18 However, this study is based on theory and lacks observations from
equatable subjects.
D. Modeling Landing Point Redesignation
This task model (with slight modifications) and the associated reference display proposed by Chua, et al.18 are the
reference works used in this current investigation. Figure 218 illustrates the task flow diagram.
Figure 2: Task Flow Diagram for Landing Point Redesignation. Landing Aimpoints are referred to as LAPs.18
This model utilizes the Keystroke Level Model of the Goals, Operator, Methods, Selection Methodology (KLM-
GOMS) proposed by Card, et al.27 The KLM-GOMS methodology decomposes a task into a series of smaller subtasks,
until the action can be described with the application of primitive operators (see Table 1) that describe the interaction
of a human with a system. All primitive operators are from Card, et al.27 unless otherwise noted. These operators
are different from those used in the original formulation of the task model. Lower operator times are utilized to better
account for highly trained astronauts that will be well acquainted with the physical layout of the LPR display and
cockpit controls. A summation of all the primitive operators gives an approximate estimation of the time to complete
the actual task, or a task execution time prediction model. The model utilized in this study is presented in Equation 1:
T (α, ε,Π, n,H) = 2.4ε+ 4.8α+ 2.02n+
6(n+ 1)(H + Π + 2)
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+ 5.72 (1)
where α is the number of alternative sites evaluated in detail (including the baseline point); ε is the training parameter,
where ε is 0 if the terrain training matches the actual terrain, 1 if the astronauts are unprepared for the actual terrain;
Π is the number of POI, n is the number of objective changes, and H is the number of ITMs18,25 .
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Table 1: Examples of Primitive Operators.
Operator Symbol Execution Time, s
Mental activity
Thinking, perception Mt 0.62
Choosing28 Mc 0.62
Point mouse P 0.80
Press/Release mouse button B 0.08
III. Experimental Setup
Although the fundamentals of LPR are deceptively simple, simulation is required to establish an analogous working
environment suitable for task modeling and testing. This simulation is composed of two major forms: hardware and
software modeling. The driving requirement for both forms is identical: To develop and implement an environment
that sufficiently emulates the true scenario experienced by the crew during LPR. In particular, the software simulation
is driven to model the LPR reference display, AFM guidance algorithm, and test the experiment hypotheses; the
hardware simulation is geared toward exhibiting the realism of next generation lunar landers. The following sections
elaborate on the respective hardware and software setup.
A. Hardware development
The hardware for this simulation consists of an external PVC frame and an interior metal-wood-posterboard cockpit
structure. The exterior frame is composed of a PVC rectangular prism covered with black cloth. The cloth-covered
prism creates an enclosed area that blocks alternative sources of light and nullifies non-experiment audio and visual
scenery. This physical enclosure most closely mimics the encapsulated nature of lunar landers and allows for distinc-
tive borders to a controlled local lunar landing environment, drawing users’ attention to the interior cockpit structure
and subsequent displays. The interior structure begins with a composition of metal frame members and wood pan-
eling to create two shelves for equipment placement. The upper and lower shelves are further elevated to reach the
appropriate levels necessary for the experiment. This setup is illustrated in Figure 3. Units are provided in feet.
The upper shelf supports panels of static instrument displays and associated switches and the lower shelf holds
three computer monitors and additional, smaller, static panels. The static instrument displays are replications and
adaptations of similar panels found on the Apollo Lunar Excursion Module (LEM). The content of these panels are
based on critical elements of the LEM that further convey the realism of this mockup.29 For example, an abort button
is included to emphasize the difficulty of lunar landing and provide an alternative should a suitable landing site not be
found. These display panels are kept static to reduce distraction from the main task of LPR. Figure 4 shows the primary
flight display (PFD) utilized in this experiment. This PFD is in color, in response to current use of the MEDS,11 or
glass cockpit, that is available on the Space Shuttle Orbiter.30
The operability of the lunar lander is further emphasized by the presence of two joysticks. These joysticks, which
are mounted on either side of the cockpit, do not provide inputs to the software but act as props. The inclusion of
joysticks is prompted by the presence of similar actuators on the Apollo LEM. However, the exact location of these
joysticks is due to a size constraint (the width of the joystick platform would not allow for sufficient maneuverability
within the cockpit) rather than a desire to fully match the Apollo LEM.
The last piece of equipment is an eyetracker. This experiment utilizes a FaceLAB4 eyetracker from Seeing Ma-
chines.31 Due to equipment availability, this eyetracker was not utilized for the first half of the experiment period,
but implemented for the later testing sessions. Figure 531 illustrates the eyetracker and the associated computing
equipment for operation.
With these major components and those described by Tolbert,29 the hardware aspects of the mock lunar lander are
sufficient to emulate the lunar lander environment. The features of the lunar lander are similar to those of the Apollo
LEM, but incorporate elements of current human space-rated equipment. Comparisons to the projected interior of
Altair, the current lunar lander, confirmed the validity of this experimental setup.32 Figure 6 illustrates the final form
of this mock lunar lander.
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Figure 3: Three View of Mock Lunar Lander Hardware.
Figure 4: Primary Flight Display.29
Figure 5: FaceLAB4 eyetracker from Seeing Machines.31
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Figure 6: Full Mock Lunar Lander View.
B. Software development
The software development is broken into subcomponents: the from-window perspective, the pseudo-AFM LPR algo-
rithm, and the LPR display.
1. From-Window Perspective
The inclusion of a window on Altair remains a heavily contested issue6 and is intricately tied to the specific role of the
onboard crew. The integration of a window poses non-trivial structural and material property concerns. A window also
implies the crew would manually operate the vehicle at some descent and landing stage, thus requiring a need to view
the external environment and terrain. A decision on the extent of the role of the onboard crew has not been finalized,
but studies such as this and others19,21,23,24 are providing the data and analysis required to make an informed decision.
Regardless of whether Altair chooses to utilize a window view, examination of the Apollo LEM (which included a
window that was vital to mission success), the Shuttle Orbiter Cockpit,12 and relevant aviation applications highlighted
a distinct need for a window/synthetic camera view to provide the crew with situation awareness.
To satisfy this criteria of providing the user with situation awareness, the simulated from-window perspective
needed to contain images of the lunar terrain from some altitude and viewing angle. These lunar terrain images must
be dynamic, and should display a forward traversing motion. Ideally, these images should also correspond to the inputs
of the user, that is, if a divert maneuver is selected, the window view would illustrate a rotation of the local horizon,
implying the vehicle has performed a rolling maneuver. However, to implement this level of fidelity is beyond the
scope of this investigation. Although this software does exist, as demonstrated by standard spaceflight simulations
(Orbiter,33 EDGE,34 X-Plane,35 EagleLander3D36), the current state of art still lacks the full breadth of lunar terrain
accessibility necessary to uniquely pair window views to final landing site areas. Additional analysis showed that this
experiment could achieve similar results with less development time by using a series of coordinated videos. The
EagleLander3D Apollo flight simulator software is used to record four approach, landing, and descent scenarios. Each
of these scenarios contained from-window perspectives from three stages of flight: vehicle pitchup, vehicle approach,
and vehicle landing. The length of video record is fixed to 30, 45, 15 seconds respectively. The vehicle approach video,
which played during the tested portion of the LPR task, is played while the user completes the LPR task. If the task
is completed sooner than the full video length, then the approach video is stopped and the landing video immediately
engages. The initiation of the landing video signals the end of the LPR task.
The from-window perspective is intended for use on the two exterior monitors on the interior cockpit structure.
Due to system processing constraints, the monitor on the commander’s side of the cockpit is active and the other
monitor is kept static. For a more realistic approach, both monitors should be utilized and one monitor should be a
reflection of the other (for full symmetry).
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2. Pseudo-Autonomous Flight Manager Landing Point Redesignation Algorithm
As previously discussed, the lunar lander is equipped with an AFM that offers alternative landing sites based on an
objective function that is set by the crew. Utilizing the alternative site selection algorithm is infeasible; thus, a pseudo-
algorithm is necessary to emulate the major aspects of the algorithm, sufficient to provide logical answers without
requiring heavy computation. The pseudo-algorithm used in this experiment is based on the AFM algorithm explained
by Forest, et al.23 The algorithm used in this study takes an input package of a landing area (typically satellite
photography of the Moon), scans this map for alternative landing sites, and outputs five map images corresponding
to each of the following objective functions:18 safety, fuel efficiency, proximity to points of interest, balanced (equal
weighting of the first three), and a priori. These functions are discussed in further detail in Section III.B.3.
The input package consists of several image files containing information regarding the specific landing scenario.
This package must contain a high quality image of the landing area (this experiment used portable network graphic
images of size 1260× 783 pixels, and is limited by the size of the touchscreen); a hazard map containing just red areas
corresponding to major landing hazards; a simplified hazard map with multi-point outline of the hazardous areas;
map(s) of the point(s) of interest, designated by a blue circle; and alternative landing site symbols, which include
markings for the landing footprint, landing footprint diameter, vehicle cross section, and AFM ranking (1, 2, or 3).
Figure 7 illustrates these input files.
(a) Raw Lunar Image. (b) Hazard Identification. (c) Final Image.
Figure 7: Input Files to the Pseudo-Algorithm.
This input package is read and the landing area is converted to a matrix, with each cell containing a value from 0 to
255, greyscale. The pseudo-algorithm treats this matrix as a LIDAR sensor scan, with each cell location corresponding
to a geographical position and cell magnitude relating to an altitude. The LIDAR measurement error is not modeled;
the resulting image is an idealized LIDAR scan result. The algorithm reads all cell locations that are not marked
within the hazardous area and takes a Euclidean vector difference between each non-hazardous point and the point(s)
of interest. This vector difference does not take into account hazards between the particular location and the point
of interest; this information is expected to be analyzed by the crew. The pseudo-algorithm continues to examine
each non-hazardous point by inspecting the landing footprint for safety and fuel consumption requirements. Slope,
roughness, and fuel consumption are calculated by Equations 2, 3, 4 respectively.
SLA = max(Mij)−min(Mij) i ∈ [i0, if ], j ∈ [j0, jf ] (2)
n = number of cells containing min(Mij)
m = number of cells containing max(Mij)
p = number of cells containing mode(Mij)
RLA =
mmax(Mij)+nmin(Mij)+pmode(Mij)












(if − i0)(jf − j0)
i ∈ [i0, if ], j ∈ [j0, jf ] (4)
where the 0 and f subscripts denote the beginning and ending cell component of the expected landing area, ra and rb
are the radii of the fuel ellipse and M is the matrix of image values. Once these terrain characteristics are computed,
the pseudo-algorithm sorts based on the weighting distribution provided for each of the five objective criteria. Logic is
included in the algorithm to ensure that unique sites are recommended - no landing site overlaps another. The output
map image for each objective function contains hazardous area highlights, the point(s) of interest, the baseline point
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and three alternative sites, and symbols for the relative goodness of slope and roughness of the expected landing area.
These maps are generated prior to the experiment and the map display corresponds to the actions of the user, simulating
a real-time calculation of alternative landing sites, without the computational cost or increased risk of system failure.
This pseudo-algorithm also computes the quality of user-selected landing sites based on the criteria presented in
each of these maps. This formula, listed in Equation 5, is based on the concept of “the perfect is the enemy of good”
(Voltaire). Although the mission wishes to place the lander in an area free of major hazards and of preferable terrain
characteristics (flat and level terrain), there exists a region where a significant tradeoff occurs between safety and
proximity to points of interest. This region is defined as “adequate” (not violating any tolerances) and to aim for a
safer site while drawing farther from the point of interest places the lander at a mission disadvantage. This region of
adequacy must be factored into the performance formula, otherwise the resulting ranking is not representative of true
lunar landing. Each quality metric (safety - slope, roughness, distance from hazards; fuel consumption; proximity to
point of interest) has a region of adequacy.
Pscore = wfFLA +DPOI + (SLA +RLA +Dh)/3
wf = − Time to DecisionTotal Time for LPR wf ∈ [0, 1] (5)
where DPOI is the distance from the POI and Dh is the distance from hazards. The element of time is also introduced
in this performance formula. Under ideal conditions, the crew would require little to no time to complete LPR as the
time to complete the LPR task is tied to other trajectory parameters, such as fuel consumed. The vehicle is assumed
to be in a trimmed position and autonomously flown during LPR, to allow the crew to fully concentrate on the task
on hand. Trimming the vehicle may require flying in a non-fuel efficient manner, which could ultimately lead to
major design reconsiderations such as accommodating a reduction in the payload mass fraction or change in launch
vehicle to accommodate lander volume and mass growth. Conversely, restrictions on time to complete LPR may lead
to poor decisions, which could lead to mission aborts or increased risk during the final stages of landing. Therefore,
the best strategy in performing the LPR task is to select an adequate landing site in the least amount of time possible.
Preserving fuel reserves may allow greater surface accessibility or reaching sites on the exterior of the fuel contour.
This fuel weighting parameter, wf is based on the fraction of time-to-decision to allowable time. Faster decisions
decrease the importance of the fuel consumption requirement of the selected landing site, whereas slower decisions
increase the importance of landing in a fuel-efficient landing site.
3. Landing Point Redesignation Display
The landing point redesignation display, as seen in Figure 8 contains information relevant to the LPR task, the mission
status, and methods of communicating to the AFM. This display has a north, center, southeast, and southwest con-
tainers (with respect to JAVA Swing terminology). The north container contains three clocks/timers: a mission clock
(far left), a redesignation timer (center), and a touchdown timer (right). The southwest container is composed of five
buttons. The first four buttons (baseline in yellow, site 1, site 2, site 3) are used to select a final landing site. The button
on the far right (Arm) emulates the two-button press method to avoid accidental engagement of a final landing site. To
designate a final landing site, the user must press one of the site buttons and then arm. Pressing a site button causes
the grey circle to turn yellow (akin to an LED light) and pressing the arm button turns the circle green. The southeast
container holds the hot keys, or objective function operator actuators. These hot keys contain predesignated safety and
proximity to point of interest tolerances and weighting distributions between safety, fuel efficiency, and proximity to
point of interest. These buttons are as defined:18
• Safety: The safest landing sites (farthest from hazards, conservative tolerances on slope and roughness). Fuel
efficiency and nearness to POI are held equal. Example of weight distribution (on a 100 point scale): 90/5/5 or
80/10/10
• Fuel efficiency: Most fuel efficient sites (typically center and forward, aft of the LIDAR scanned landing area).
Safety and nearness to POI are held equal. Example of weight distribution: 5/90/5, 10/80/10
• Proximity to points of interest: Nearest to POI. This objective could be interpreted in different ways, if there
are multiple POIs presented: the AFM could find aim points nearest to all POIs, or the AFM could find the
closest aim points to at least one POI. This research assumes the later interpretation. Tolerances on slope and
roughness are less stringent and safety and fuel efficiency are held equal. Example of weight distribution: 5/5/90,
10/10/80
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• Balanced: Equal, or balanced weight distribution between safety, fuel efficiency, and nearness to POI. Weight
distribution: 33/33/33
• A Priori: This distribution is based on mission planning projections of the objectives deemed to be most critical
during LPR. This distribution does not include any real-time data. The baseline aim point is based on this weight
distribution.
This hot key concept allows for a greater diversity in objective functions without requiring the operator to manually
set tolerances and distribution weights. Lastly, the center container consists of a map of the expected landing area
and essential information. Information such as alternative landing sites, fuel consumption, slope and roughness, and
landing footprint are overlaid on the map to ease crew workload. As noted by Chua and Major,25 reference displays
that are organized in a two panel scheme tend to result in a task bottleneck due to information cluttering and inefficient
landing site evaluation. Thus, relative information are placed directly on the map for 1:1 comparison and to minimize
eye movement.37 Table 218 lists the major symbols used in this display and their representation.
C. Experimental Procedure
There were three major objectives of the LPR experiment:
1. To inform the current task model by observing the strategies used by experienced pilots.
2. To compare true performance to the predicted task execution times.
3. To determine the efficacy of the current lunar landing redesignation display design.
Pilots were enlisted to participate in the experiment and perform the LPR task in controlled conditions. These pilots
were all Private Pilot Licensed (PPL) and had at least 80 hours of flying experience. There were no limitations or
restrictions on age, gender, or height. This participant criteria was established to ensure analogous astronaut behavior,
without sacrifice to the number of sample data points.
Twenty pilots participated in this experiment, representing a wide variety of flight experience and pilot training.
The pilots have flown single- and multi-engine aircraft both for personal and commercial uses. Figure 9 illustrates the
distribution of pilot certification and a histogram of the hours of flight experience.
The mean was 277 hours of flying, with a standard deviation of 307 hrs. There were no military pilots participating
in this experiment, and only one pilot had experience flying helicopters. The majority of the participants were college
students, less than 30 years old. The pilots, unknown to them, were randomly separated into two groups based on ITM
frequency. There were eight participants in the (2,4) ITM group and 12 participants in the (1,3) ITM group. Figure 10
illustrates the distribution of pilot certification and flight experience across the two groups.
The mean number of flight experience was 181 hrs in the (2,4) group (σ(2,4) = 140.5 hrs) and 340 hrs in the (1,3)
group (σ(1,3) = 373.1 hrs). The discrepancy in flight hours and inequality of VFR/IFR pilots was not determined until
after the experiment, and as such, flight hours and pilot certification are included as covariates in the data analysis.
Likewise, the experiment setup was intended to have an equal distribution of pilots for both groups, but there were a
few instances where the pilot could not be sufficiently trained to complete the LPR task. There were also instances
where the method of data collection was flawed. The data for those pilots are not included in the experimental analysis.
Each testing session lasted two hours. The pilot participation time was broken into three segments: initial brief-
ing/practice, testing, debriefing. The initial briefing provided an introduction to the experiment, the LPR task, and the
simulator. The pilots were given approximately 45 minutes of guided practice on the LPR task, in the simulator, where
they received feedback on their performance. This practice time allowed the pilots to become comfortable with the
simulator and also to formulate strategies. The testing session took about 15 minutes. Each participant completed eight
trials in a variety of pre-selected landing scenarios. The scenarios were based on science missions (usually involv-
ing sample return, establishing lunar laboratories, or investigating a scientific phenomenon). Every opening training
screen included two images from various satellite perspectives of the expected landing area. The training screen is
presented in Figure 11. A list of all scenarios used is provided in Appendix VIII. The pilots were also informed that
the lander was equipped with a rover, but the capabilities of the rover were limited.
Half of these trials were interrupted for situation awareness testing, using the SAGAT technique.38 The scenarios
were developed based on combinations of the three independent variables:
• Points of Interest: Two-level variable: (1,2) Landing sites that drive the purpose of the mission. These are either
scientifically interesting landing sites or the location of assets.
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Figure 8: Landing Point Redesignation Display.
Table 2: List of Major Symbols for the LPR Display.
Symbol Description
Green ellipse Fuel Contour. The Astronaut Crew Office reported a fuel contour as critical information to
execute the LPR task. This display utilizes a green ellipse superimposed on the photo of the
landing area to divide the map into reachable and non-reachable fractions. All alternative landing
sites are located within this ellipse. This ellipse also represents the relative fuel cost for each
landing site. Landing aim points located closer to the center and along the major axis of this
ellipse required less fuel than aim points located on the on the fringe and minor axis.
Dashed purple circle Vehicle Footprint Dispersion Error (VFDE). The VFDE is represented by a dashed purple circle
proportional to the area encapsulated on the map. The diameter of the vehicle footprint plus
errors is listed in a box in the lower half of this purple circle.
Green circle Vehicle cross-sectional area. The vehicle cross-sectional area is represented by a green circle
located in the center of the VFDE circle. The size of this cross-section is equivalent to the area
on the map. Superimposing this information on the landing map also allows the operator to
quickly determine the relative distance from hazards and the POIs.
Left and right green ar-
rows
Terrain characteristics. The terrain characteristics of each LAP are represented directly on the
map. A modification of the four axis LAP information representation developed by Needham in
2008 is used for this study. Two of the four axes, slope and roughness margins, are utilized. The
hazard and fuel margin axes are represented by other symbols. The slope and roughness margin
information is displayed in the same manner prescribed by Needham.24 Three marks along
the axes are used to represent dangerous terrain characteristic (defined as, at the threshold),
tolerable, and desired (far from the threshold). The arrows are desired to be as long as possible,
hence representing a safe LAP.
Blue circle Points of interest. The points of interest are represented in blue and proportional to the size of
this area. Circles and other geometric shapes can be used to represent lunar assets, or scientific
spots of interest.
Numbered circles The numbered circles represent the goodness ranking of the AFM. This numbering also serves
the dual purpose of identifying the alternative landing sites while providing the only means of
communicating ranked AFM recommendations.
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(a) Distribution of Pilot Certification (b) Distribution of Flight Experience
Figure 9: Demographics of Partipants.
(a) Distribution of Pilot Certification (b) Distribution of Flight Experience
Figure 10: Demographics of Partipants within the ITM groups.
Figure 11: Example of Training Screen Presented Prior to Every Scenario.
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• Terrain Expectancy: Two-level variable: (matching, unexpected) Notes whether the actual terrain matches ex-
pectations (i.e., pre-mission training). If the actual terrain matches the training terrain, then the astronauts have
better situation awareness than if the terrains do not match. If the terrains do not match, we expect the astronauts
to search for Identifiable Terrain Markers (ITMs) through their window, to gain situation awareness. The lunar
maps were modified to mimic the variable shading of the terrain. An example of this expectancy is illustrated in
Figure 12. The images to the left were presented during the opening training screen and the image to the right
represents the actual terrain.
Figure 12: Terrain Expectancy.
• Identifiable Terrain Markers (ITM): Four-level variable: (1,2,3,4) Hazards or hazard clusters (within a landing
footprint of each other). This variable is also blocked, with participants viewing either 1, 3 or 2, 4 hazard maps.
The full range of scenarios is listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Design of Experiments: 2 × 2 × 4
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
POI 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Expectancy M M M M M M M M U U U U U U U U
ITM 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
As mentioned previously, the blocked variable in this experiment is hazards. Thus, participants only experienced
half of the scenarios. This sorting and exposure is random. The order of the runs is also random within and between
participants. Since several lunar surface maps were reused for different scenarios, the stringent condition for scenario
run order was that a map also used for the unexpected scenario could not be shown to the pilot prior to experiencing
that particular scenario. Thus, scenarios 10-16 typically occurred prior to their counterparts in scenarios 1-9. This
distribution of scenario run order reduced any potential bias in run order (within and between subjects).
This experiment collected several dependent measures. These measures are:
• Performance. The participants are given the option to examine 15 alternative landing options, which includes a
nominal landing site. The participant can choose to evaluate these options by pressing a hot key to change an
objectives (Section III.B.3). These landing sites are ranked relative to each other. A final algorithm computes
the performance score, based on the time needed to make a decision and the final landing site selected.
• Sequence of Events. The sequence of events is assessed by keeping track of participant actions. Each mission
event (such as LIDAR data availability) along with each display interaction is timestamped and recorded. This
record is made by the display simulator software. The first and last display interaction is recorded. The sequence
of events assists in understanding the strategy, and record the actions completed by the participant.
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• Time associated with each display interaction. The duration of interaction touch is also recorded. This informa-
tion aids in primitive operator estimation.
• Eye fixations. The eyetracker notes the fixation of the eyes on the display and the window. This data assists in
the determine the effectiveness of the display in terms of types and layout of the information.
• Situation Awareness (SA). Half of these runs employ Situation Awareness Global Assessment Testing (SAGAT).
The simulation is frozen once and prompts the user to answer questions regarding their current task and working
knowledge. The questions are superimposed on the LPR display, which cannot be referred to by the pilots during
the freeze. The correctness of the answers to these questions determines the current level of the participant’s
SA. This test is composed of a variety of questions. There are three levels of SA, all of which are utilized in
this experiment: Level 1 - Perception; Level 2 - Comprehension; Level 3 - Projection. A list of the SAGAT
questions is listed in Table 4.
• Display effectiveness. The display effectiveness is based on the overall performance score (as computed by the
algorithm). The participant is also presented with a post-experiment questionnaire, where they are asked to rank
the display in terms of quality and are also prompted to provide insights on display elements that worked or
failed. The participants are also asked to rate the display based on the Modified Cooper-Harper Evaluation for
UAV operator displays.39
• Strategy. The task model assumes a nominal strategy that is independent on which buttons are pressed, or the
strategy in selecting a landing site. Thus, this metric is of particular importance to shed insight on the strategies
employed by participants. The participant is exposed to carefully designed scenarios that incorporate different
levels of the independent experiment variables. A “talk-aloud” post-experiment briefing method is used for at
least one run, to allow the participant to recount his or her specific methodology.
• Window Usage. Eyetracker data and post-experiment surveys are employed to determine the window usage.
• Choice of landing quality metric. Another interesting metric is the participant-derived definition of landing
quality metrics. This choice of landing quality metric is collected by recording the number of hot key presses
and from explicit recall during the post-experiment briefing regarding participant strategy.
Additional information regarding the experiment procedure, such as the pilot pre-briefing and debriefing materials,
are included in Appendix VIII.
IV. Analysis of Experiment Results
This section discusses the results of the experiment, including the global participant performance and the results
of the data analysis.
A. Overall Results
Nineteen participants completed all eight runs and the twentieth participant completed five of the eight runs (due to
unforeseen simulation failure), for a total of 157 cases across the full design of experiments. The pilots completed the
task within the 45 seconds allotted; no pilot had to abort a run. On average, the LPR task was completed in 20.39
seconds (σ = 9.05seconds), with the fastest run taking 4.08 seconds and the slowest requiring 41.53 seconds. Overall,
the pilots were able to make excellent decisions as to where to land. In 54% of the runs, the pilot chose one of the
top three sites, whereas 7% of the runs resulted in the pilot choosing the relatively “worst” sites. While these sites are
still feasible landing locations, better sites were available. Figure 13 illustrates the distribution of these site selection
rankings and the time to complete the LPR task. Figure 14 ilustrates the same information, but with regard to each
pilot certification. The CPL certification is misleading, as there is one only pilot in that category, eight runs total. The
VFR pilots succeeded in choosing one of the top three sites in 56% of all their run attempts and the IFR pilots achieved
the same level of performance in 51% of their respective runs. The mean times to complete for VFR pilots and IFR
pilots were 21.13 (σV FR = 9.52 s, [5.82, 41.53]) and 18.38 (σIFR = 18.38 s, [4.08, 36.88]) seconds, respectively.
The time to complete and site selection ranking were compared to determine if there was a significant correlation.
Figure 15 illustrates scatterplot of time to complete vs. site selection ranking and the corresponding box plot. Because
this data is not normally distributed, a non-parametric test was used to determine if there was a correlation. There is a






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Site Selection Rankings (b) Time to Complete
Figure 13: Distribution of Performance.
(a) Site Selection Rankings (b) Time to Complete
Figure 14: Distribution of Performance Per Pilot Certification Category.
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that the longer a pilot takes to make a decision, the worse the overall performance will be. This relationship is intuitive,
as the fuel penalty increases with time. However, there are most likely other factors affecting the site selection ranking
other than the time to complete.
(a) (b)
Figure 15: Correlation between time to complete and Site Selection Ranking.
In general, the pilots preferred an objective function other than a priori. Figure 16 illustrates the percentage of
cases where the pilot selected a final landing site from that particular objective function. Selection of the baseline
site was included under the a priori category, as this site is selected prior to mission launch. However, the baseline
point is available as a landing site option regardless of the engaged objective function. The pilots were recorded as
selecting the baseline point or one of the a priori sites more often than any other selection criteria in unexpected
terrain. This observation is not surprising, implying that pilots were more inclined to select a relatively-“known”
site in an unknown environment. Predictably, the POI objective function was utilized the least, in only 11.4% of the
unexpected terrain cases. This low percentage suggests the pilots were more concerned about their safety or the limits
of the landing vehicle than landing near the POI. Conversely, the opposite effect for POI was experienced in expected
terrain. Although the a priori objective function was utilized most of all criteria, in about 18% of all cases, the pilots
seemed to be more inclined to find sites closer to the POI.
(a) Overall (b) Unexpected Terrain (c) Expected Terrain
Figure 16: Preference in Objective Function.
Most pilots found the display useful in completing the LPR task. On a scale from 1-10 (best to worst) on the
Modified Cooper-Harper Display Evaluation, pilots generally ranked the display at a score of 2 (“good with negligible
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deficiencies”) or 3 (“Minor but Tolerable Deficiencies”) (Figure 17). Frequent complaints with the display concerned
the representation of information, usually in the category of color or symbol size. Section A discusses in more detail
the specific concerns and suggestions for improvement.
The pilots were also given the option to evaluate the window display. This window display, as previously men-
tioned, contained pre-programmed videos of simulated vehicle pitch-up, approach, and landing sequences. There was
no correlation between the maps used for the LPR task and these videos. Most pilots found the window view to be
“partly useful”, with over half the pilots agreeing with the corresponding statements (Figure 18). This result is contrary
to the initial belief that due to the lack of pertinent information available from the window, the pilots would be inclined
to rank the window view as “not useful”. Pilots’ responses to the window view were varied. Several pilots commented
on the repetition of the video, and a few believed one video was used for all of their scenario runs. At least one pilot
believed there was a correlation between the window and the training maps used for the LPR task, asking out loud if
the mountain ridge in one pitch-up maneuver video was the edge of the crater in the satellite footage. In general, most
pilots spent the first few runs dividing their attention between the training screen and the window. In the later runs,
the window was either glanced at sparingly or ignored entirely. The window was rarely consulted during the actual
LPR task. The window view was also where the pilot received notification of LIDAR scan initiation. Some pilots used
this information to prepare for the task, settling into different body positions and turning their head toward the LPR
display. A few pilots even placed their hand closer to the LPR display, either in the general vicinity of the hot keys or
over one key in particular.
Figure 17: Modified Cooper-Harper Rating.
B. Time to Complete
As discussed in Section II, the time to complete the LPR task is a critical value, impacting elements of lunar landing,
such as the fuel consumption requirement and the design of the landing trajectory. Therefore, improved understanding
as to the factors driving time to complete will assist in system design and mission planning. In this experiment, there
were several hypotheses regarding task completion time.
First, task modeling of LPR implied that environmental and scenario factors would affect the time to complete. The
logic behind this hypotheses was that an increase in the amount of external cues (such as number of ITM, number of
POI) would result in additional information processing time. In particular, the terrain expectancy factor was included
in the task execution time model to account for the terrain orientation exercise performed by expert pilots. A three-
way repeated measures ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) was used to test the significance (α = 0.05) of POI, ITM,
and expectancy. Flight experience and pilot certification were also included in the ANOVA as covariates. There was
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Figure 18: Window View Preference.
no significant main effect of POI on either the ITM(1,3) group, F (1, 6) = 1.372, p = 0.286, and the ITM(2,4) group,
F (1, 3) = 0.130, p = 0.742. The main effect of terrain expectancy is not significant on either group, ITM(1,3)
F (1, 6) = 0.028, p = 0.872, and ITM(2,4), F (1, 3) = 5.315, p = 0.104. The number of ITMs is also not significant
on the ITM(1,3) group, F (1, 6) = 0.084, p = 0.782, and the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) = 0.223, p = 0.669. The
covariates, flight experience and pilot certification, were generally not significantly related to any of the main effects
for either group. Table 5 lists the statistical results for each ITM group. However, the pilot certification was marginally
significantly related to the number of ITMS for the ITM(1,3) group, F (1, 6) = 4.782, p = 0.071. The flight experience
was marginally significantly related to the terrain expectancy for the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) = 6.460, p = 0.085.
The interaction between terrain expectancy and ITMs is reported as significant for the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) =
10.349, p = 0.049. The effects of these interactions are plotted in Figure 19.
Second, the issue of learning from previous runs was hypothesized as a potential effect on time to complete. A
one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was applied to address this issue. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption
of sphericity had been violated for the main effect of run order, χ2(27) = 53.120, p = 0.003. The degrees of
freedom are corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (εGG = 0.558). The effect of run order
was reported as not significant on time to complete, F (3.908, 62.524) = 0.676, p = 0.608. The covariate flight
experience is not significantly related to run order, F (3.908, 62.524) = 0.215, p = 0.926, nor is pilot certification,
F (7, 112) = 0.860, p = 0.491.
Third, the pilots were observed to perform the LPR task differently, depending on whether the run included a
SAGAT questioning freeze. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was used to test the significance of SAGAT
(and the run order of the four SAGAT tests) on the time to complete. Mauchly’s test indicated that the sphericity
assumption has been violated for the interaction of the main effects, χ2(5) = 11.857, p = 0.038. The degrees of
freedom are corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (εGG = 0.639). The effect of SAGAT run
order was reported as not significant, F (3, 36) = 0.684, p = 0.568. The interaction between the main effects are
not significant, F (1.917, 23.007) = 1.885, p = 0.150. The covariates, flight experience and pilot certification, were
generally not significantly related to any of the main effects. Table 6 lists the statistical results.
The effect of SAGAT on/off was reported as marginally significant on time to complete, F (1, 12) = 76.719, p =
0.091. In addition, the covariate flight experience is marginally significantly related to SAGAT on/off, F (1, 12) =
3.228, p = 0.098. The effect of these interactions are plotted in Figure 20.
Lastly, a two-way independent measures ANOVA was used in order to determine if flight experience and pilot
certification were significant main effects on time to complete. The pilot certification was not a significant effect,
F (1, 134) = 1.069, p = 0.303, but the flight experience was a significant effect on time to complete, F (15, 134) =
8.692, p = 1× 10−13. Flight experience seems to be negatively related to time to complete, r = −0.260, p < 0.020,
meaning that pilots of greater flight hours generally completed the task quicker than pilots of less flight experience.
Figures 19band 20b illustrate this relationship.
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Table 5: Results on the Impact of POI, ITM, and Expectancy on Time to Complete.
ITM(1,3) ITM(2,4)
Source df, Err. df F p Source df, Err. df F p
POI ×ε 1,6 0.053 0.826 POI ×ε 1,3 0.308 0.617
POI × ITM 1,6 0.890 0.382 POI × ITM 1,3 0.223 0.669
ITM ×ε 1,6 0.016 0.903 ITM ×ε 1,3 10.349 0.049
POI ×ε× ITM 1,6 0.533 0.493 POI ×ε× ITM 1,3 3.463 0.160
POI × Flight Hrs 1,6 0.161 0.702 POI × Flight Hrs 1,3 2.2 ×10−4 0.989
POI × Pilot Cert. 1,6 0.030 0.869 POI × Pilot Cert. 1,3 0.004 0.956
ε × Flight Hrs 1,6 0.024 0.881 ε × Flight Hrs 1,3 6.460 0.085
ε × Pilot Cert. 1,6 0.432 0.536 ε × Pilot Cert. 1,3 5.208 0.107
ITM × Flight Hrs 1,6 4.782 0.071 ITM × Flight Hrs 1,3 0.155 0.720
ITM × Pilot Cert. 1,6 0.612 0.464 ITM × Pilot Cert. 1,3 0.119 0.753
(a) ITM and Pilot Certification on the ITM(1,3)
group
(b) Terrain Expectancy and Flight Hours on the
ITM(2,4) group
(c) Terrain Expectancy and Flight Hours on the
ITM(2,4) group
Figure 19: Effect of Covariates and Main Effects on Time to Complete.
Table 6: Results on the Impact of SAGAT On/Off and SAGAT Run Order on Time to Complete.
Source df, Err. df F p Source df F p
On/Off × Flight Hrs. 1,12 3.228 0.098 On/Off × Pilot Cert. 1,12 2.171 0.166
SAGAT Run Order ×
Flight Hrs.
3,36 1.372 0.267 SAGAT Run Order × Pilot
Cert.
3,36 0.969 0.418
On/Off × SAGAT Run Or-
der × Flight Hrs.
1.92,23.01 0.661 0.520 On/Off × SAGAT Run Or-
der × Pilot Cert.
1.92,23.01 1.926 0.170
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(a) SAGAT on/off (b) SAGAT on/off with Flight Hours
Figure 20: Effect of SAGAT On/Off on Time to Complete
These factors affecting time to complete, especially the lack of significant effects from POI, terrain expectancy, and
ITM, are surprising. There are several plausible reasons for the lack of effect on time to complete by the scenario and
environmental effects. First, there were two common approaches pilots used to handle the POI. Some pilots focused
on one of the two sites, eliminating the other completely as a landing site attraction. The basis for elimination were due
to hazard proximity or fuel contour location. This decision was sometimes made based on the satellite photography
provided before every run, or during initial evaluation of the LIDAR sensor scan results. Other pilots would attempt
to find a landing site that was equal distance from the two POI. In both approaches, pilots noted the use generating
a mental map of the expected landing area and mentally highlighting/focusing on favored “sweet spots”, “zones”,
or “quadrants” of where ideal landing sites were desired to occur. As such, pilots may not have spent a significant
amount of time evaluating the second POI. Second, the not significant effect of terrain expectancy may be caused by
multiple sources, such as inadequacy of the experimental design or varying strategies. The visuals used to simulate
terrain expectancy may not have been sufficiently different (see Figure 12) to cause an appreciable delay in the LPR
task. Results from the ANOVA imply that pilots of varying flight experience view terrain expectancy differently. Pilots
reported not evaluating the satellite photography before receiving the LIDAR sensor scan results. However, several
pilots did note that the terrain looked “different” or “unexpected”. One pilot, who was VFR rated, remarked that he
disregarded the satellite photography in later runs, commenting on “needing some time to reorient and figure out what
I’m looking at”. Another VFR pilot mentioned being surprised by the results of the LIDAR scan, when discovering
that “[the landing area] wasn’t as bad as [he] thought it would be”. These issues associated with terrain expectancy
are similar to those regarding the effect of ITMs. The ITMs, in both the experiment and the model, are quantified
by discrete values. However, observations from the experiment imply that the logic enumerating the ITMs is not
universal. The design of the experiment maps may not have established an appreciable difference between a low (1,2)
and high (3,4) number of ITMs. For example, in 28 attempts (of all pilots) at answering the SAGAT question, “How
many hazards are on the screen”, in only twelve instances was the right answer provided. Furthermore, pilots seemed
to regularly underestimate the hazardous nature of the expected landing area. The experimental maps were designed
to have 66% - 75% non-hazardous area. When prompted with the SAGAT question, “What percentage of the map is
hazard-free? (Don’t know, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75%)” only 8 out of 21 attempts at this question were correct. The wrong
answers were generally lower percentages or unknown. The results of the ANOVA also imply that different pilot
certification (VFR vs. IFR) may approach ITMs differently, particularly when the AFM hazard identification differed
from the results of the LIDAR sensor scan. In several scenarios applied to this lunar map, at least one alternative site
was placed directly over the magnified region in Figure 21.
The pilots were told to handle the LIDAR sensor results as they would with their standard flight instruments, as to
avoid any unnecessary bias with regards to pilot’s perception of automation fidelity. The responses of VFR and IFR
pilots on the interpretation of lunar terrain geometry provided significant insight to this hazard identification process.
One VFR pilot treated this region as a hazard, commenting on how he “didn’t really trust the [LIDAR] sensor” as
this region was not identified as a dangerous spot. In contrast, several IFR stated they were trained to “trust [their]
instruments”. One IFR pilot described the difficulty in visually finding the local horizon under sub-par conditions,
as cloud layers and atmospheric effects would confound intuition. She applied these experiences to this experiment
and treated the terrain as “probably just shadows”. Even though this experiment did not intentionally measure trust in
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Figure 21: Ambiguity of Lunar Terrain due to Lighting and Ground Geometry Effects.
automation, this incident may be one of the contributing factors to time completion.
Although the reported results on the effect of SAGAT questioning were reported as marginally significant, exper-
imental observations implied the effect should have been significant. Although the reported results on the effect of
SAGAT questioning are not surprising, the level of impact is unexpected, given experimental observations. SAGAT
is intended to unobtrusively gather information regarding situation awareness. However, this secondary task had
unanticipated consequences. Common complaints noted the length of SAGAT questions (in terms of wording and
comprehension of question meaning), the general interruption into a high workload scenario, and questions regarding
a strategy that they did not employ. With regard to the latter, the SAGAT questions were written assuming that pilots
would be able to identify any alternative site based on their AFM ranking/identification, without visual cues. However,
as several pilots noted, those alternative sites were identified based on the relative position of the site to some other
measure, such as within a mental projection of a four quadrant space. Thus, when asked to identify which of the
four (baseline, 1, 2, 3) sites exhibited a certain terrain characteristic, the pilot was unable to recall the site number,
but knew, for example, that the upper left site was in an area of favorable slope and roughness margins. The pilots
also expressed frustration at interruptions to the LPR task. On several runs, pilots were observed to be momentarily
confused after completing the SAGAT questions. Some pilots rapidly switched between two or three hot keys; others
pressed a hot key despite engaging the landing site selection ARM button. The pilots confirmed during the debriefing
that they were attempting to recall the last task prior to SAGAT questioning. One pilot believed he could have com-
pleted the LPR task faster, had the SAGAT test not interrupted his thinking. Although SAGAT tests were introduced
in the practice runs, perhaps a change in mental intensity between the practice and actual experiment runs contributed
to pilots’ struggles in transitioning from SAGAT test to experiment.
C. Accuracy of Selected Landing Site
The success of a mission is heavily dependent on the accurate selection of a landing site. The quality of the landing
site is based on Equation 5 in both continuous and ordinal form. This analysis uses both forms of the variable. As
with the measure time to complete, there were several hypotheses regarding the factors affecting accuracy of selected
landing site. Understanding these factors can assist in better astronaut training to counter adverse effects and can aid
in collecting evidence for the role of the astronaut pilot during lunar landing.
First, several pilots commented on the familiarity of some lunar maps. Although there were eight lunar maps
total, each pilot saw eight different scenarios over six different lunar maps. This limited number of maps is due to
the unavailability of maps with the terrain features needed in this experiment. All maps are modified images from the
Lunar and Planetary Institute.40 As such, two maps were seen twice each in the actual experiment. The unexpected
scenario and the respective map was always seen before the repeat of the same map, to avoid negating the effect
of terrain unexpectancy. The same map was not seen twice in a row - at least one different map separated a repeat
viewing. However, the concern that familiarity with the landing terrain might cause a bias. To determine whether
viewing the landing maps twice was an effect on accuracy of landing site, Friedman’s ANOVA was applied to the four
maps (two maps each only viewed by the two ITM groups). The results of this test are listed in Table 7. The results of
Friedman’s ANOVA report no significant effect on viewing a lunar map twice.
Second, a few pilots had mentioned that certain lunar maps were more difficult than others. Although the maps
were designed to be equivalent and experiment trial runs did not report a map bias, pilot perceptions of their land-
ing environment may be more tuned to smaller details. Comparing the accuracy in site selection with respect to
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Table 7: Effect of Repeated Views of Maps on Accuracy of Landing Site.
Map B Map C Map E Map H
df 1 1 1 1
χ2 1.286 0.333 0.200 0.200
p 0.257 0.564 0.655 0.655
each map (Figure 22) suggested there might be an inequality. Friedman’s ANOVA was used to test this hypothe-
sis. There were significant effects on the accuracy of the site selection based on the maps seen by the ITM(1,3)
group, χ2(5) = 12.550, p = 0.028, and marginally significant effects from the maps viewed by the ITM(2,4) group,
χ2(5) = 10.944, p = 0.053. Comparisons of the maps (Figure 22) showed that map A was more challenging than the
others. To account for this nuisance variable, maps were included as a covariate in analyses relating to accuracy of
selected landing site, enough degrees of freedom permitting.
(a) ITM(1,3) group. (b) ITM(2,4) group.
Figure 22: Comparison of Map Terrain on Site Selection Ranking.
The third hypothesis concerned the impact of environmental and scenario factors on accuracy of landing site selec-
tion. The site selection ranking was expected to deteriorate as the number of POIs and ITMs increased, and especially
in instances where the terrain was unexpected. A three-way repeated measure ANOVA was used to determine the
significance of these main effects. The results of this test reported POI as not significant for the ITM(1,3) group,
F (1, 6) = 0.156, p = 0.706, nor is it significant for the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) = 0.159, p = 0.717. The effect of
terrain expectancy is not significant for the ITM(1,3) group, F (1, 6) = 0.916, p = 0.376 and is also not significant
for the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) = 1.399, p = 0.322. The number of ITMs is marginally significant for the ITM(1,3)
group, F (1, 6) = 5.926, p = 0.051 but is not significant for the ITM(2,4) group, F (1, 3) = 0.265, p = 0.642. Figure
23 illustrates the effect of ITM on Accuracy of the selected landing site. The interactions and relations with covariates
are listed in Table 8.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses, regarding the effect of run order, SAGAT questioning, and pilot SA level,
were formulated based on the same observations with respect to the time to complete metric. Similarly, each additional
run may significantly assist the pilots in selecting better landing sites. The interruptions to the LPR task due to SAGAT
questioning may have affected the selection site quality. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was utilized to test the
fourth hypothesis. The results of Mauchly’s test show that the assumption of sphericity is violated for run order. The
Greenhouse-Geisser degree of freedom correction is applied (εGG = 0.383). The main effect, run order, is reported as
not significant, F (2.680, 21.442) = 0.712, p = 0.541. Table 9 lists the statistical results of this analysis. No covariates
were significantly related to the run order.
The fifth hypothesis was tested using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. The main effect of SAGAT on/off
was reported as not significant, F (1, 12) = 2.354, p = 0.151. SAGAT run order was also reported as not significantly
affecting the accuracy of the landing site selection, F (3, 36) = 0.708, p = 0.553. Table 10 lists the statistical results
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Figure 23: Effect of ITM on Accuracy of Landing Site Selection for the ITM(1,3) group.
Table 8: Results on the Impact of POI, ITM, and Expectancy (ε) on Accuracy of Selected Site.
ITM(1,3) ITM(2,4)
Source df F p Source df F p
POI ×ε 1 0.298 0.605 POI ×ε 1 0.702 0.464
POI × ITM 1 0.317 0.594 POI × ITM 1 3.024 0.180
ITM ×ε 1 1.948 0.212 ITM ×ε 1 3.101 0.176
POI ×ε× ITM 1 1.128 0.329 POI ×ε× ITM 1 0.014 0.915
POI × Flight Hrs 1 1.827 0.225 POI × Flight Hrs 1 0.120 0.752
POI × Pilot Cert. 1 1.681 0.242 POI × Pilot Cert. 1 0.004 0.954
ε × Flight Hrs 1 1.104 0.334 ε × Flight Hrs 1 0.594 0.497
ε × Pilot Cert. 1 3.723 0.102 ε × Pilot Cert. 1 0.666 0.474
ITM × Flight Hrs 1 0.000 0.984 ITM × Flight Hrs 1 0.280 0.633
ITM × Pilot Cert. 1 0.272 0.621 ITM × Pilot Cert. 1 0.420 0.563
Table 9: Results on the Impact of Run Order and Covariates on Accuracy of Selected Site.
Run Order × Run Order ×Maps during run
Source Flight Hrs Pilot Cert. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
df,9.564 1.027 1.609 2.451 0.826 0.657 1.017 1.320 1.812 1.336 1.583
F 0.859 1.346 2.050 0.690 0.550 0.851 1.104 1.515 1.118 1.324
p 0.467 0.285 0.142 0.552 0.635 0.470 0.364 0.241 0.365 0.256
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of this analysis. No covariates were significantly related to SAGAT run order.
Table 10: Results on the Impact of SAGAT On/Off and SAGAT Run Order on Accuracy of Selected Site.
Source df, Err. df F p Source df F p
On/Off × Flight Hrs. 1,12 1.800 0.205 On/Off × Pilot Cert. 1,12 3.313 0.094
SAGAT Run Order ×
Flight Hrs.
3,36 0.742 0.534 SAGAT Run Order × Pilot
Cert.
3,36 0.216 0.884
On/Off × SAGAT Run Or-
der × Flight Hrs.
3,36 0.870 0.466 On/Off × SAGAT Run Or-
der × Pilot Cert.
3,36 0.915 0.443
The sixth hypothesis was tested by determining correlations between each level of SA and the site selection
ranking. The amount of correct SA Level 1 questions was reported as non significant on the site selection rank-
ing, τ = −0.062, p = 0.283. SA Level 2, however, was a marginally significant effect, τ = −0.132, p = 0.093, along
with SA Level 3, τ = −0.217, p = 0.056. Both of these are negative correlations, implying that increased awareness
at these two levels assists in better site selection. Figure 24 illustrates these trends.
Figure 24: Trend of SA level and Site Selection Ranking
Lastly, the seventh hypothesis is with regard to the effect of flight experience and pilot certification on the accuracy
of the landing site selection. The LPR task, in the most fundamental form, is similar to the in-flight emergency known
as “engine out”. Engine out occurs when a single-engine aircraft experiences an engine failure. At this time, the pilot
needs to make an emergency landing over land.41 As described by several pilots, the standard procedure involves
stabilizing the aircraft and finding a suitable place to land. The pilot must quickly find a landing area of level and
relatively smooth terrain and choose this place to land. He cannot deliberate too extensively on where to land, as time
is critical and the pilot must ensure he can maneuver to the desired landing location. This procedure is a required
skill for all licensed pilots. As all participants are aware of this procedure from standard pilot certification, the more
experienced pilots are believed to select better sites. To test this hypothesis, a two-way independent ANOVA was
utilized. The main effect of flight hours was reported as not significant, F (15, 134) = 0.809, p = 0.666. The effect of
pilot certification was also deemed not significant, F (1, 134) = 0.069, p = 0.561. However, a low selection site score
could also be a highly ranked site, relative to the other alternatives. To examine this trend, a non-parametric test was
applied to determine the correlation between the main effects and the site selection rank. There is a significant positive
correlation between the pilot certification and the site selection rank, τ = 0.414, p = 0.015. Of the three pilot certifi-
cations represented in this experiment, VFR pilots generally picked better sites than IFR and CPL pilots. However ,a
non significant negative correlation exists between flight experience and site selection rank, τ = −0.012, p = 0.423.
The results of the statistical analysis regarding accuracy of landing site and site selection ranking are surprising. As
hypothesized, environmental and scenario factors were expected to cause the accuracy of the site to decrease. Except
for the ITM(1,3) group and the number of ITMs, none of these factors were considered significant. There are several
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possible reasons for this result. The reasons stated for time to complete (Section B) are most likely applicable here:
regarding two POI as one due to strategy; inadequacies in the experimental design with respect to terrain expectancy;
differences in interpretation of terrain features. The ITM(1,3) group, which is about an equal distribution of IFR and
VFR pilots, tended to pick worse sites when the number of ITMs increased. This effect, which was expected, may be
caused by other factors not captured in this particular set of statistical analysis.
D. Situation Awareness
The LPR task requires a substantial amount of mental workload and some degree of SA. However, the level of SA
required to complete LPR, much less the necessary level for accurate LPR, is unknown. There are two aspects of SA
that should be investigated. The current SA level of the pilot permits better understanding as to the utilized strategies
and the associated information used for task completion. The SA level provided by the display assists in maintaining
the pilot’s SA and acts as an essential rapport for pilot-work domain interaction. Intuitively, a poor display design
can hinder or worsen a pilot’s SA, whereas a well-designed display supports and enables more efficient work. This
experiment was used to answer several hypotheses regarding SA. An increased appreciation for the issues regarding
SA during LPR were determined from the results of the following analyses.
First, the LPR display was designed in a manner to support SA. If designed appropriately, then the pilots should
be able to answer the majority of the SAGAT questions. The answer to this question is not a succinct conclusion to
the capabilities of the display, as the ability to answer SAGAT questions is dependent on the pilot’s obtainable SA.
However, this measure does shed some initial insight to the efficacy of the LPR display. As seen in Table 4, there were
eighteen SAGAT questions. One question, #15, was eliminated from further consideration due to the ambiguity of
the question. Multiple pilots did not recognize that the opening screen of the LPR task (where satellite photography
of the expected landing area was provided) was considered scenario training. In total, there were seven Level 1, seven
Level 2, and three Level 3 questions. Table 11 lists the number of question attempts and the percentage correct.
Table 11: Results of the SAGAT questions
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Question # 1 2 5 6 7 9 18 3 4 8 11 12 14 17 10 13 16
Attempts 27 22 26 29 28 19 15 21 16 23 24 22 8 17 28 17 15
% Correct 44 27 73 76 61 63 33 38 31 30 19 32 13 29 57 35 60
Total Correct 93/166 = 56% 37/128 = 29% 31/60 = 52%
Overall, over half of the Level 1 and 3 questions were answered correctly. The performance on the Level 2
questions was not as high, with about a quarter of the questions answered correctly. The display may provide SA
Level 1 and 3 but may also be lacking in providing SA Level 2. Further investigation is necessary, to determine the
true SA capabilities of the LPR display. However, these results may be influenced by other factors.
The second hypothesis concerns whether environmental and scenario factors have an impact on the different levels
of SA. As a scenario becomes more complex, with multiple POI, unexpected terrain, and several ITMs, the SA levels
may be negatively affected. The perception of data (Level 1) may decrease, but the comprehension of meaning (Level
2) and projection of near future (Level 3) are most likely unaffected. Three one-way repeated measures ANOVAs were
used to determine the significance of the main effects. The main effect of POI was reported not significant to SA Level
1, F (1, 10) = 0.673, p = 0.431, Level 2, F (1, 14) = 0.923, p = 0.353, or Level 3, F (1, 8) = 0.631, p = 0.450.
The terrain expectancy did not have a significant effect on Level 1, F (1, 10) = 0.002, p = 0.968, Level 2, F (1, 11) =
0.277, p = 0.609, or Level 3, F (1, 8) = 0.807, p = 0.395. The number of ITMs was not significant to Levels 1, 2, or
3, for either the ITM(1,3) or ITM(2,4) groups. Table 12 lists the results of the statistical analyses for POI, ε, ITM, and
the covariates flight hours (FE) and pilot certification (PC). The ITM main effect was not modeled with covariates due
to a lack of degrees of freedom.
The third hypothesis relates to an observation of pilot behavior. Several pilots mentioned they were unable to
correctly answer some of the SAGAT questions because they were unaware of what they would be questioned on.
The SAGAT questions were designed as such that the pilots would not know all of the questions beforehand, to avoid
biasing the pilot strategy. However, multiple SAGAT runs may have created a learning effect, where pilots were more
capable of answering SAGAT questions in later runs. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine
whether SAGAT run order played an impact on the percent correctness of the SAGAT questions. The results of this
test reported that the SAGAT run order did not have a significant effect on the number of correctly answered Level 2
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Table 12: Results of POI, terrain expectancy, ITM, and covariates on SA Levels 1, 2, and 3.
Source ITM(1,3) ITM(2,4) POI × FE POI × PC ε × FE ε × PC
SA Level 1
df, Err. df 1,10 1,6 1,10 1,10 1,10 1,10
F 0.507 0.107 0.066 0.408 0.399 0.123
p 0.493 0.755 0.802 0.538 0.542 0.733
SA Level 2
df, Err. df 1,10 1,7 1,14 1,14 1,11 1,11
F 0.490 0.057 0.480 0.005 0.510 0.094
p 0.500 0.819 0.500 0.946 0.490 0.765
SA Level 3
df, Err. df 1,4 1,3 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,8
F 0.444 2.455 0.000 0.568 0.461 0.092
p 0.541 0.215 0.991 0.473 0.516 0.770
questions, F (3, 23) = 0.665, p = 0.579. There are no results for SA Level 1 and 3, due to a lack of representative
data over the four SAGAT runs.
Lastly, although all pilots, regardless of flight experience and pilot certification, should experience all three levels
of SA during flight, the question was posed whether more experienced pilots or pilots of varying certification were
more inclined to answer the questions correctly. A two-way independent ANOVA was used to examine this question.
The effect of flight experience was reported as not significant on SA Level 1, F (15, 18) = 3.868, p = 0.381, or
Level 2, F (15, 18) = 2.551, p = 0.462. However, flight experience was reported as significant on SA Level 3,
F (15, 18) = 5.38 × 1028, p = 0.000. The effect of pilot certification was reported as not significant on SA Level 1,
F (1, 18) = 0.043, p = 0.869, Level 2, F (1, 18) = 0.000, p = 0.999. The pilot certification, like flight experience,
was reported as significant on SA Level 3, F (1, 18) = 8.24× 1028, p = 0.000. Figure 25 illustrates this effect for SA
Level 3. Correlation coefficients were determined as a follow-up to the results of the ANOVA. Kendall’s τ coefficient
is given as non significant negative correlation, τ = −0.064, p = 0.359, between flight experience and Level 3
correctness. There is no correlation reported for pilot certification and Level 3 correctness, tau = 0.000, p = 0.500.
The differences between these correlations and the ANOVA results most likely are related to the applied assumptions.
(a) Flight Experience. (b) Pilot Certification.
Figure 25: Comparison of Pilot Demographics and SA Level 3 Correctness.
The results of the statistical analysis provide insight to the factors that affect SA and the capability of the display
to provide SA. However, these results are not entirely conclusive, due to a number of external factors. For example,
as mentioned in Section IV.B, assumptions were made regarding the strategy and pilot perception of data. This use
of AFM recommendation identification was primarily applied to Level 2 questions. Therefore, the low percentage
of correct Level 2 questions (relative to the other levels) is most likely the result of this disparity. Most likely, had
the questions prompted the pilots to identify sites on a map, then more correct answers would be given. This visual
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based approach is the method employed by Level 3 questions, a potential cause for why, counterintuitively, more
projection-based questions were correct than comprehensive scenario questions.
The percentage of correct answers to certain SAGAT questions was lower than expected There were three Level
1 questions asked based on information that was experienced prior to the eight LPR runs. First, #5 asked, “How
many landing sites are displayed right now on the screen (Baseline and alternatives)? [1, 2, 3, 4, Don’t Know]”. A
similar form of this question was actually asked during the experimental briefing. Pilots were told that the baseline
site and four alternatives were marked with every hot key button, except for a priori, where the baseline and a priori
site # was the same. Most answers were “3 sites” or “4 sites”. The second question, #7, asked, “What is the landing
footprint diameter? [5, 10, 15, 20, 25 m, Don’t Know]”. The landing footprint diameter was also a question during
the pilot briefing, and is one of the few pieces of information that stays static, at 20 m, through all of the runs. Over
a quarter of the question attempts were marked “Don’t Know”. The last question, #6, asked, “How many points of
interest are on the screen? [1, 2, Don’t Know]”. This information, which varies per scenario, was provided to the
pilot along with satellite photography of the expected landing area. As seen in Figure 11, arrows were used to draw
the pilot’s attention to the number and location of the POI. The percentage of correct answers to these questions is 73,
61, and 76%, respectively. These percentages indicate that one or several issues are occurring. The pilots may have
misunderstood the question, due to misreadings under timed situations, or lack of exposure to that particular question.
The pilot may also have forgotten or not been trained enough on this particular simulator. Additional practice with
the simulator may result in a higher percentage of correct answers, and lead to better similiarity to astronauts, who
are most likely highly well-trained on a vehicle interface. Furthermore, the incorrect answers to these questions may
simply be a matter of erroneous button pushes. In the case of the question regarding POI, the pilots may have mentally
eliminated one POI from working memory, instead focusing on the more attainable POI. The answers to this question
seem to suggest this line of reasoning, as most incorrect answers are “1 point” when the answer was actually 2 POI.
The lack of significant effect due to POI, terrain expectancy, and ITM imply that pilots’ SA are robust to a variety
of scenarios. This result suggests that pilots may perceive the data as a collective whole, rather than “chunks” of
information containing a singular element (such as two chunks for two POI). The data also suggests that pilots may be
filtering information to have better control over the overall scenario. Multiple pilots stated there was “ a lot going on”
and several pilots commented on “partitioning” the lunar map into areas of desired and negligible spots.
E. Landing Point Redesignation Strategies
The strategies employed by the participants fell into two distinct camps and seemed to be independent of flight ex-
perience or pilot certification. This data was collected using pilot debriefing and counting frequency of occurrences.
The experiment procedure was designed with the assumption that more experienced pilots would behave more like
experts and employ a particular strategy rather than less flight experienced pilots. This dichotomy of strategy was
noted by Klein,26 who commented on expert behavior with regard to decision-making. Klein initially hypothesized
that experts formulated options en masse and carefully compared and eliminated options until a global best is deter-
mined. However, his field observations proved contrary to this hypothesis. Instead, in unexpected situations lacking
a clear strategy, experts reacted to external stimuli (perception of sensory cues) and quickly formulated options until
a sufficient option was determined. At that point, no other options were further considered; the decision-making pro-
cess was deemed complete. The behavior in Klein’s original hypothesis best describes the behavior of non-experts,
defined as people lacking the necessary experience and knowledge in that particular domain or field. In relation to this
experiment, the non-expert behavior was expected to manifest itself in multiple hot key presses, whereas the expert
behavior was expected to correspond to a singular or a maximum of two hot key presses. When questioned about their
strategy, pilots who employed the multi-button press commented on a desire to find the best landing site, attempting
to remember the best site under each hot key and comparing this site to others. Pilots of the single/double button press
were typically concerned with one or two criteria, such as fuel or safety. As one pilot commented, “you don’t want to
be running out of juice [fuel], so make a quick decision and stick with it”.
However, closer examination of the distribution in strategy did not follow this trend. Furthermore, pilots slightly
varied the number of button presses between runs, although each pilot generally fell into one type of strategy over the
other. Figures 26 and 27 show the distribution of strategies employed through the experiment. For lack of representa-
tive data, the CPL pilot is included with the IFR pilots.
While the multiple objective change strategy is popular with both VFR and IFR pilots, IFR pilots are more likely
to utilize fewer button presses than VFR pilots. There does not seem to be a trend between the types of strategy and
the pilot flight experience. An argument can be made that flight experience on aircraft is not analogous to even a mock
lunar landing simulation, and thus, the participants probably needed more experience with the LPR task before more
closely resembling the behavior of experts. Future studies should account for this learning curve, but the experiment
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Figure 26: Distribution of Strategy Use across Pilot Certification.
Figure 27: Distribution of Strategy Use across Flight Experience.
procedure was not originally intended to test Klein’s theory of decision-making.
The pilot debriefing revealed several interested trends between the allotment of responsibility between automation
and pilot, based on the pilot certification. IFR pilots seemed to be more inclined to trust the results of the LIDAR
sensor scan and the AFM calculations, more so than VFR pilots who tended to doubt the validity of the LIDAR sensor
results. The behavior of IFR pilots may be more consistent with expected astronaut behavior, especially since future
lunar terrain is projected to occur in hazardous regions of poor visibility. Future experiments may consider recruiting
IFR pilot participation only, for a stronger analogy to astronaut training. Lunar-bound crew must have some reliance
on their instrument observations, especially when flying to hazardous areas; as demonstrated on Apollo 12, the viewing
angle and lighting conditions can cause visual distortions on the terrain.42 Similarly, more hazardous scenarios may
prompt for an adjustable allotment of responsibility between pilot and automation, particularly in juggling objectives
and information. Unexpectedly, several pilots in this study would “share” responsibilities with the simulated AFM.
These pilots generally belonged to the single/double-button party, preferring to optimize on one landing metric over
the others, and trusting the AFM to optimize on the other qualities. For example, the same pilot who noted the need to
reserve fuel (“juice”) typically engaged the balanced or a priori hot keys only. Based on the alternative sites calculated
on those objective functions, he selected the sites that required the least amount of fuel and attempted to make his
decision quickly. He typically made a decision on the landing site within 10 seconds. Since he felt fuel reserve was
the most critical aspect of his vehicle, he was more confident and assured that he would be apt at optimizing fuel
consumption. Other pilots exhibited similar behavior, selecting the balanced hot key and further optimizing on their
number one priority. One pilot demonstrated this strategy, but her reasoning was slightly different. Her desire to save
on fuel and quickly land prompted her to deliberately ignore the information presented by the other hot keys. She
felt there was too much information to absorb, and thus to maximize her control over the scenario, she limited her
choice of alternatives to a select few. This particular observation prompts a more in-depth discussion on automation
allocation, perhaps an architecture that will adapt to the user’s workload and end goals, to avoid overwhelming the
user. However, this concept of automation allocation is not within the scope of this experiment.
Pilots that employed the multiple objective function change strategy also utilized various sub-strategies of search-
ing for their desired landing site. Several pilots treated the hot key buttons as an arbitrary binning system. Each button
press revealed three new choices, but as the pilots perceived them, they did not regard them as a filtering mechanism.
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As one pilot stated, “[the researchers] could’ve labeled [the buttons] as anything, I didn’t pay much attention to what
they actually stood for”. Because of this perception, these pilots would often view each hot key several times, refining
their final decision. Generally, these pilots found the hot key arrangement to be impeditive - several pilots suggested
a “see all button”, a method of flagging sites for further investigation, or a means to eliminate undesired options. Al-
though workload was not measured in this experiment, these pilots commented that recalling each site, including the
hot key that revealed this site, was a challenge. All five hot keys were engaged serially on the initial review of the site
alternatives; other buttons would be pressed when required for further investigation. This hot key usage strategy was
not universal. Some pilots pressed the hot keys based on their preference for landing site criteria. For example, one pi-
lot regarded the order of safety, fuel, and then proximity to POI as his preference of most important to least important.
His order of hot key selection mirrored this mentality. Other pilots engaged the hot keys in the same order they were
presented, but with a purpose. One pilot believed that more important objective functions should be physically closer
to the pilot. He also felt that a cockpit interface designer would arrange the hot keys in a similar fashion, so pilots who
were new to the vehicle (he regarded himself as such a pilot) would comprehend that this construction was the order
of objective function importance. This pilot’s attitude, while most likely not universal, reinforces the significance of
the cockpit display interface.
The inclusion of the SAGAT questioning prompted an unintended effect on some pilots’ strategies. For example,
one pilot was observed to spend more time in the later runs examining the initial alternative sites, compared to his
initial runs. When questioned about this peculiar change in behavior, he expressed a desire to answer more SAGAT
questions correctly and as a result, spent more time examining the initial alternative sites and the location of ITMs
and POIs. He stated he felt “should probably know the answers to the [SAGAT] questions”. Statistical tests showed
there is a marginally significant negative correlation between the percentage of correct SA questions and the site
selection ranking (level 2 and 3 only). This test confirms the pilot’s belief that with better SA, he was able to more
confidently and accurately pick a quality landing site. Few pilots, however, exhibited this behavior. A one-way
repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine the effect of run order on time to first button press. Run order
was reported as not significant, F (7, 112) = 0.706, p = 0.667. The time to first button press for the ITM(2,4)
group was not significantly affected by any environmental or scenario factors such as POI, terrain expectancy, and
ITMs. However, the ITM(1,3) group was significantly affected by the interaction between POI and ITM, F (1, 5) =
15.628, p = 0.011. The covariates of flight experience and pilot certification related to this interaction were reported as
significant, F (1, 5) = 11.574, p = 0.019 and F (1, 5) = 11.189, p = 0.020, respectively. Figure 28 and 29 illustrates
these trends. For purposes of this analysis, CPL is included with the IFR group.
Figure 28: Effect of POI, ITM interaction with Pilot Certification on Time to First Button Press.
The pilots were also asked informally during the debriefing their mental perception of the task time remaining.
Some pilots performed the LPR quickly (15 seconds or less) whereas other pilots took more time to complete the task
(35 seconds or more). One pilot, who consistently used most of the 45 seconds allotted commented that he typically
had a particular landing site in mind within the first twenty seconds, but would use the rest of the time to refine this
site selection. When the ten second countdown warning alarm went off, he was not particularly concerned about
completing the task in time, as he had his default site selection to rely on. Other pilots, however, were observed to
react to the warning alarm, physically moving their hand and selecting a site within a few seconds after the first alarm
chime. No pilot reported or was observed to consistently refer to the mission clock or LPR timer, and the majority
of the pilots felt they had a strong sense of how long they took to complete LPR. However, the answers to the time
related SAGAT questions reveal that pilots may not have been as acutely aware of the elapsed time during the actual
process. SAGAT questions #2 and #18 asked, “How much time is remaining for Redesignation/Touchdown? [60-51,
50-41, 40-31, 30-21, 20-11 sec]”, respectively. These two questions were answered 33% and 27% correctly out of all
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Figure 29: Effect of POI, ITM interaction with Flight Experience on Time to First Button Press.
attempts. Pilots generally overestimated the elapsed time, believing there was less time remaining for redesignation
and touchdown. However, about a quarter of the answers were “Don’t Know”, revealing that the countdown timers
were not explicitly remembered by the pilots.
Lastly, Klein’s theory states that different strategies may yield different results.26 Since experts are not particularly
concerned with finding the global best, the overall quality of their selection is generally sufficient. However, non-
experts may not fare any better, as they opt to find the global best with little knowledge about the subject domain. To
test this hypothesis and see if subscribers of one strategy performed better than others, a correlation was sought
between the type of strategy used and the site selection ranking. The results of this positive correlation are not
significant. Spearman’s correlation coefficient is given as ρ = 0.009, p = 0.472. Therefore, for this experiment
solely, multiple button presses may lead to worser site selection rankings, but this trend is not significant.
F. Model Comparisons
A major objective of this experiment was to inform the LPR task model based on performance analogous to lunar-
bound astronauts. The LPR task predicts the time to complete, assuming the site selected is the top ranked site.
This time estimation changes depending on the environmental and scenario factors of POI, terrain expectancy, and
number of ITM. The model was compared against the actual results of all the number one ranked sites, across all pilot
certifications. Figure 30a illustrates these results.
Overall, the model was able to fit 28 of the 53 applicable experimental data points, or 53%, within the predicted
time range. The rest of the data fell almost equally below and above this time range. This fit was approximately the
same for the three pilot certification groups. Of the 34 applicable data points from VFR pilots, 56% were fitted (equal
distribution falling above and below); of 17 points from IFR pilots 53% of the data were fitted (the model overpredicted
35% of all data); and of the four points from the CPL pilot, 50% of the data were fitted (the model underpredicted
the other half of the data). The model was also compared against experimental data that matched the same strategy
assumed for the model (zero to two objective function changes) and had achieved the top site selection ranking. Figure
30b is a plot of these results.
The model did not fit this set of data as well, with only 44% of the 18 applicable data points fitting. The model
tended to overpredict the time required to complete LPR, with the rest of the experimental data falling below the
predicted time range. The trends presented in Figures 30b and 30b imply that several factors may be in play. First,
pilots may not be behaving similar enough to astronauts, and thus this experimental data is not representative of the
conditions stipulated by the model. Second, the model may not be accurately portraying the true strategies utilized
for LPR. This model assumes that all subtasks are completed linearly. However, comments from the pilots imply
that several tasks are completed in parallel. As seen in Section E, pilots often neglected elements of information,
or examined information on a whole basis, rather than individual components. The model assumes each aspect of
the scenario is individually accounted for, thus accounting for steps that are not truly executed. This model must be
improved to account for these actions or changes in strategy. This deterministic model requires the use of probabilistic
modeling, to provide more use in approximating the likelihood of a particular outcome or strategy use. Understanding
the time to complete LPR allows for better trajectory design. While a major lander system re-design is highly unlikely,
as the astronauts will most likely be trained to complete the LPR task within the constraints of the system, appreciating
















































trajectory and support system design.
V. Discussion
The analysis of the experimental results have provided significant insight to human performance during LPR.
The three major experiment objectives have been obtained. First, the task model was demonstrated to predict the task
completion time for about half of the applicable experimental results. The task model, however, may require a redesign
to take into account different modeling strategies, such as multiple button presses. The task model can also be improved
by accounting for actions done in serial and the perception of terrain data by expert pilots. Mission designers may find
the task model more useful should the model provide probabilities, rather than simply discrete information. The time
to complete and quality of the landing site were both fairly robust to environment and scenario factors. Learning did
not significantly occur during the actual experiment and secondary tasks such as answering SAGAT questions did not
significantly impact pilot performance. Second, the model was determined to overpredict the time to complete LPR
for participants who utilized the same strategy of zero-to-two objective function changes. The model was not more
accurate for one pilot certification or the other, as the model equally over- and underpredicted task completion time.
Third, the experiment enabled the opportunity to determine the efficacy of this LPR display design from both MCH
ratings and open-ended pilot feedback. The pilots generally liked the LPR display design. The LPR display provided
them more information than the window view and was also able to provide them some amount of situation awareness.
Incorporating pilot feedback into the second round of display design will most likely further improve overall pilot
performance.
A. Improvements to the LPR Display
There were several aspects of the LPR display that the pilots liked, and other aspects that warrant improvement.
Most pilots commented on the usefulness of simple symbols and relative information (in comparison to quantitative
numbers). The relative information allowed for quicker processing. Absolute values were rarely provided (except in
the instance of landing footprint diameter) - the pilots were unaware of the specific kilograms of fuel, or the euclidean
distance between the landing site and points of interest. The overlay of relative information over the expected landing
site prompted for an efficient analysis of prime sites. Almost all pilots reported looking for “long arrows [level and
smooth terrain]”, “sites closer to the blue dots [near points of interest]”, “away from red areas [distance from hazards]”,
and “closer to the center [of the fuel contour, implying relatively less consumption of fuel]”. Some pilots liked the
inclusion of the baseline point and its accessibility from every aspect of the LPR task. One pilot found the baseline
point as a useful comparison “as to what [the mission planners] thought was a good site”.
The feedback on the AFM ranking/site identification number was neutral - most pilots did not use this piece of
information. The pilots reported liking the idea of having a numerical output of the landing footprint diameter, but
stated they did not actively use that knowledge in the landing site selection process. Most pilots suggested a different
layout of the hot keys. Pilots employing the multiple objective function strategy generally desired a “see all” button
as discussed in Section E. Other suggestions regarding hot keys included a means to store or collect sites for further
evaluation, or a method to clear sites no longer under consideration. One pilot suggested increasing the number of
alternative sites from three to five.
The most common suggestion on display change was with respect to the slope and roughness margins. Adapted
from Needham (who utilized a four axis system), this two axis system was “difficult to see”, especially when super-
imposed on low contrasting map images. Pilots suggested a greater use of color, with red alerting below tolerance
margins, yellow signaling within tolerance margins, and green designating ideal sites. One non-pilot, who assisted in
the qualification of the LPR system, advocated the use of more intuitive symbols. Instead of lines, the slope margin
could be represented by some angular deflection of that axis about the local horizon. A steeper slope would cause this
arrow to be at a higher angle. Roughness could be represented by a sine/cosine relation - higher amplitudes and larger
frequencies would imply more rough terrain, whereas smooth terrain would tend toward a straight line. The most
likely explanation for differences in response to Needham’s proposed iconography is due to participant age. Need-
ham’s participants were generally graduate students (approximately < 28 years of age), whereas pilots in this study
ranged from college undergraduates to retirees. As one might expect, the majority of seeing complaints came from
older pilots, where eye degradation can be a significant factor.
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B. Review of Simulation and Experiment Setup
There were several areas of possible improvement to the simulation and experiment setup. First, the pseudo-AFM al-
gorithm should be improved to better account for the slope and roughness margins of the alternative landing sites. The
pseudo-algorithm could also better account for the point of diminishing returns. Several pilots noticed the algorithm’s
lack of sensitivity to both these issues and commented on not being able to trust the outputs for each hot key. One
pilot was particularly adamant about his lack of trust in the AFM algorithm, instead choosing to search under each
hot key and find the site of his liking. A greater source of equatable lunar maps and scenarios would have improved
the variety of runs in this experiment. Although seeing a map twice was shown to not have a significant effect on
site accuracy, a greater assortment of maps most likely would increase the possibility of independent sampling. The
SAGAT questioning system could have been set up in a more uniform manner, with preplanned comparisons and
contrasts of SAGAT on and SAGAT off runs. The questions should also better mimic the perception and storage of
knowledge, to avoid confounding lack of SA with question ambiguity. A more equal distribution of questions at each
level would help ascertain a sufficient sampling of data, as well as a longer time to answer questions. Lastly, several
elements of the LPR display should change with time to more realistically mimic the LPR scenario. The fuel contour
was held static in this experiment and represented the reachable area should the entire 45 seconds be used. Ideally, this
contour would shrink with time, and sites would disappear as viable options. The landing footprint diameter readout
should also change with time, to incorporate the continuous update of uncertainties in navigation and vehicle state.
The quality of the lunar map should also change in time, to better reflect a continuous LIDAR scan.
C. Extrapolation of Experimental Results
This experiment has increased overall knowledge of human performance during LPR. This experiment was not de-
signed to investigate or compare human control versus automated/autonomous control. However, given the results
of this study, one can extrapolate and draw some initial observations on the overall topic. The trajectory of a fully
autonomous landing is not modeled in this experiment. Most likely, a fully autonomous trajectory would not follow a
similar trajectory design of a manned lander, as LPR would not be necessary. However, analogous automated perfor-
mance could be defined as a selection of the baseline point in zero seconds (in other words, no alternative sites were
considered). Performing the LPR task in zero seconds incurs no additional fuel consumption. Already, the astronauts,
who require at least several seconds to absorb information and make a decision, are penalized for using fuel. However,
an astronaut can potentially make better decisions as to whether a better landing site exists.
Taking this definition of analogous automated performance into account, the performance of each of the 157 total
cases was compared and determined as to whether the human scored equal to or higher than the automated score. A
10% margin is applied - falling within this margin is equatable to the automated score. This comparison of true human
performance takes into account the time to complete LPR and the quality of landing site selection, based on an equal
weighting distribution between fuel, safety, and proximity to POI. Figure 31 summarizes the result of this comparison.
Figure 31: Comparison of Actual Pilot Selection vs Analogous Automation Selection.
The human pilots were able to select equal to or better sites than what could be achieved with an autonomous
landing in 20% of all the cases. While this percentage seems low, the percentage of cases scoring higher than the
analogous autonomy would most likely increase if the pilot decisions were made faster. To explore this concept, the
time to complete for each case is varied and compared against automation. Figure 32 illustrates several comparison of
varying, actual, and matching automated and human performance.
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Figure 32: Comparison of Varying, Actual, and Matching Analogous Automated and Pilot Performance.
For this comparison, the varying pilot performance assumes that in each case, the pilots make the same site se-
lection, however a hypothetical task completion time is used. This situation assumes that all cases are performed in
the same amount of time. This line illustrates that if all pilots could complete the LPR task in 15 seconds or less,
then 20% of all cases will score better than the best autonomous performance. The best automated performance is the
standard baseline selection in zero seconds. However, beyond 25 seconds the human performance is heavily penalized
by the fuel consumption, with less than 10% of the cases scoring better than the autonomy. To further emphasize the
significance of completing the LPR task quickly, the actual pilot performance (site selection choice, time to complete)
was compared against an autonomous lander that selects the baseline site in a variable time to complete. This graph
underscores the significance of fuel consumption - after 15 seconds human performance scores higher than variable
autonomous performance in 60% of all cases. Lastly, the autonomy and pilots were compared assuming both parties
completed the LPR task in the same amount of time. Figure 32 clearly illustrates the advantage of performing the LPR
task quickly. If the pilot can make the same quality of a decision within 12 seconds, then about half of his runs will be
better than if the lander was flown autonomously. Ideally, this graphic should demonstrate asymptotic behavior around
zero seconds, but in the actual experiment there were cases where the pilot picked a worse site than the baseline.
Figure 33 illustrates this comparison from a different perspective. The safety and proximity to POI scores for the
baseline site are only considered, plotted against the actual time to complete for each case. As this figure illustrates,
when fuel is not a significant factor, the pilots generally pick better sites than the automation. Even when expending
the full allotment of fuel (45 seconds), half of the pilot site selections are equal to or greater than the automated choice.
However, the percentage of better performance begins to degrade as the time to complete increases.
Figure 33: Comparison of Analogous Automated and Pilot Performance, Safety and Proximity to POI Scores Only.
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To further examine this design space, the performance algorithm, namely, the distribution between the weighting
of the three main criteria, fuel, proximity to POI, and safety, was varied from 0 (no importance) to 1 (full importance).
One metric was varied at a time and the two remaining metrics were equally normally weighted based on the com-
plement. This weighting distribution was then used in Equation 5 to calculate the final site selection score. Figure 34
illustrates contours of these weighting distributions.
Figure 34: Comparison of Analogous Automated and Pilot Performance, Safety and Proximity to POI Scores Only.
These contours are based on actual site selections, but with hypothetical task completion times. In general, the
human outperforms the automated vehicle, however, the percentage of better performance varies depending on the
weighting distribution. In many ways, these contours are analogous to cumulative distribution functions (CDF). If
the 157 cases performed in this experiment are representative of typical site selection choices during LPR, then these
contours can assist in determining the conditions for human control. For example, if the lunar vehicle was constrained
to hold enough fuel for 20 seconds of LPR, then the mission designer can compare human and automated performance
for different combinations of weighting distributions. These contours show that if the primary driving factors are
safety, proximity to POI, or both, at weighting distributions of at least ≥ 0.7, 0.6, or 0.45 each, respectively, then the
human will choose a better landing site than a automated vehicle 60% of all cases. While these contours are useful
in providing initial estimations to the LPR task, one should apply this information with the acknowledgement that the
modeled human performance may not be accurately representative of true astronaut behavior and that a automated
lander would most likely not operate under the same conditions as a manned lander. Thus, true CDF plots will be
more useful in examining this design space.
VI. Extensions to Mars
The expected results of this study could be extended to applications of human spaceflight on Mars where the
exploration of human support systems and the impact of human performance on space systems design is of great
importance. The dual investigation of landing large payloads while understanding the necessary requirements to
support a range of human control will assist in the development of robust spacecraft systems.
The lunar LPR task is unlikely to translate to a single opportunity during Mars EDL, unless improved technology
increases the amount of rotational and translational control of the Mars vehicle. More likely, Mars-LPR will occur
relatively early in the mission timeline, but require the same brevity in task completion, without sacrifice to accuracy.
As such, knowing the duration of LPR (even if applied to a different terrain) will assist in understanding the required
vehicle state and adjustments to the EDL event sequence. The examination into the potential human-automated trade
space discussed in Section V.C illustrates these tradeoffs associated with time. Adjustments must be made to account
for Mars-specific mission objectives. Furthermore, the recommendations for display design are also relevant and can
be applied to landing humans on Mars. While the information presented may change to account for differences in
environment (such as winds, ground temperature, etc), the lunar display provides an initial reference for humans to
Mars. Lastly, the investigation of pilot population and accuracy of selected landing site provides quantitative analysis
for the selection and training of future Mars astronauts.
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VII. Future Work
Although the experiment results shed insight to human performance during the LPR task, additional studies are
required to further the fidelity of this model. The task model is currently a deterministic model. A probabilistic model
would allow examination of the full depth and breadth of human control while establishing a likelihood of outcome.
This probabilistic model should also take into account steps and procedures that could potentially be completed in
parallel, or the possibility of skipping subtasks during the LPR. The probabilities for these astronaut tasks will be
based on the astronaut’s performance shaping factors; the vehicle system state and navigational error; and the mission
status. A model of this fidelity, to the author’s knowledge, does not currently exist for LPR.
This model should also be used in attempt to quantify the impact of human control. Although the LPR task is
one out of several anticipated crew obligations, the risk and uncertainty involving the LPR task is significantly greater
than standard procedures such as system monitoring. Thus, the LPR task should be developed into a computational
human performance model (CHPM). This CHPM will be integrated into a 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF) landing simu-
lation. The final integrated product is, essentially, a human-in-the-loop (HITL) trajectory simulation. This trajectory
simulation should model both translational and rotational dynamics of a pinpoint surface landing. Furthermore, this
simulation must include atmospheric and gravity models, terminal guidance algorithms, terrain and inertial naviga-
tional sensors, and control actuators based on the reference vehicle design. The development of a separate landing
simulation is not a trivial task, and existing 6 DOF lunar simulations should be considered as baseline reference
trajectories.
Once the LPR task model is integrated with a trajectory simulation, a Monte Carlo analysis and a Design of
Experiments could be used to examine a range of environmental conditions and the extent of human control. Results
and observed trends from these simulations will be analyzed and summarized. Preliminary results from the process
of setting probabilities and development of the CHPM will also provide insight into the human control impact on
trajectory design. Elements of these determined environment states establish initial approximations on desired flight
conditions. A post-run analysis of simulation results can provide full mission profiles of trajectory parameters and
useful metrics. These metrics include, but are not limited to fuel consumption, time to landing, the flight envelope,
and the trajectory profile. These mission profiles will be compared to profiles of autonomous missions, thus spanning
the full range of human control.
VIII. Conclusion
Increasing mankind’s presence in space, especially on the Moon and subsequently Mars, requires a significant
amount of technological development and further understanding in the areas of human control and spacecraft design.
In particular, critical mission phases such as entry, descent, and landing poses unique questions as to the role of the
onboard crew and the systems necessary to support variable levels of involvement. The task of lunar landing point
redesignation is an ideal case study for examining these issues. In this investigation, an experiment has been developed
to inform an LPR task model, to compare true performance to the predicted performance, and to determine the efficacy
of current LPR display design. The experimental results have highlighted several key conclusions regarding the LPR
task.
First, the strategy assumed in the LPR task model does not match true performance. The method of LPR task
execution is not necessarily linear, with tasks performed in parallel or neglected entirely. IFR pilots are also more likely
to change objectives faster than VFR pilots. The elapse in time during LPR is generally not known or overestimated.
Second, the time to complete the LPR task is generally robust to environmental and scenario factors such as number
of points of interest, number of identifiable terrain markers, and terrain expectancy. Aspects of the expected landing
area are typically regarded as an entire entity rather than individual chunks of information. Pilots of greater flight
experience typically complete the LPR task faster than pilots of less flight experience. Pilots tend to underestimate
the hazardous nature of the expected landing area. The accuracy of the selected landing site is also fairly robust to
environmental and scenario factors. Increased levels of situation awareness generally improve the accuracy of the site
selection, particularly levels of greater data comprehension and projection of near future events. Third, environmental
and scenario factors do not significantly effect the amount and level of situation awareness. The perception of data
may be poor due to strategy and inexperience with the display interface. Fourth, the display design provides all
levels of situation awareness but the exact amount requires further investigation. The layout of the LPR display was
generally well received, but the presentation of terrain characteristics should be modified to incorporate color and
more intuitive markings. Pilots also suggest that additional methods of landing site comparisons be provided with
this display. Fifth, the examination of the overall tradespace between the three main criteria of fuel consumption,
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proximity to points of interest, and safety when comparing human and analogous automation behavior illustrates that
automated landing tended to perform better than actual pilot performance. However, human performance begins to
excel automation performance when the time to complete decreases. An initial exploration into variable weighting of
the three criteria shows that humans outperform automation in missions where safety and nearness to points of interest
are the main objectives, but perform poorly when fuel is the most critical measure of performance. Lastly, the results
of this exploration and can be applied to manned Mars entry, descent, and landing, and the Mars equivalent of landing
point redesignation, but additional analysis is needed to draw accurate conclusions. Improvements to the fidelity of
the model can be made by transgressing from a deterministic to probabilistic model and incorporating such a model
into a six degree-of-freedom trajectory simulator.
This research has provided additional information regarding human performance during the landing point redes-
ignation task. While this investigation does not fully and extensively quantify the impact of human performance on
support system design, these results increase evidence to make informed decisions on larger mission design questions
such as the role of humans during entry, descent, and landing. While some may view returning to the Moon as simply
stepping in two-decade old footprints, this return and the subsequent set of lunar steps are providing the foundation
for leaps and bounds into the next era of manned spaceflight.
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Appendix
This section includes supplementary materials used in the experiment.
A. Scenario Mission Statements
Each scenario began with the sentence, “You have 30 seconds until Landing Point Redesignation (LPR)” and ended
with “Our satellite imagery has captured this photograph of the landing area. You should expect the landing area to
look similar. Results from the sensor scan will highlight dangerous hazards and provide terrain information”. The
following science missions were used:
• Scientists would like to return to either one of these landing sites. Results from the initial trip note the presence
of an unusual mineral compound not normally found on Earth. They would like you to run some more extensive
testing on-site and dig deeper into the regolith.
• Scientists believe large mineral deposits exist underneath the regolith in this landing site region. They would
like you to run tests on-site and eventually bring back samples. These mineral deposits may be able to sustain
future lunar bases.
• Scientists believe this is a mineral rich area, the result of the impact that left the crater nearby. They would
like for you to land at this site (see arrow), run some on-site tests, and also help in the establishment of a lunar
laboratory.
• Scientists want to examine the ejecta from nearby craters (see arrows). They believe the craters were formed at
different times, but the ejecta will confirm the exact dates. Both sites will provide a wealth of knowledge. There
is no preferred landing site.
• Scientists believe there are significant amounts of dark mantle deposits from pyroclastic eruptions. They would
like you to take samples from this landing site (see arrow). These samples should confirm whether the minerals
in these deposits can be harvested.
• Scientists believe there is a wealth of data about our universe at these two landing sites (see arrows). One is near
a large crater and should contain information about a fallen meteorite. The other site is a dark mantle deposit
from a pyroclastic eruption. Both sites are important. There is no preference between the two.
• Scientists believe this is an ideal site for setting up a lunar geology station (see arrow). However, before any
foundations are laid, they would like you to test the soil for necessary mineral compositions such as iron,
magnesium, and aluminium.
• Scientists have noted the presence of lunar objects such as agglutinates and believe this landing area (see arrow)
should contain several high-quality samples. They would like you to retrieve these objects.
• Scientists are interested in learning more about this straight rille, sometimes formed by localized lava channels.
They would like you to land at this site (see arrow) and run some on-site tests.
• Scientists want to investigate two sites of interest. The first potentially contains a straight rille, which are formed
by localized lava channels. The second is an impact crater tha did not previously exist less than a decade ago.
Both sites are of significant value. There is no preference between either site.
• Scientists would like to return to the place of a fallen meteorite. Astronauts previously erected a miniature
experimental station (see arrow). This experimental station requires some repair and the collection of obtained
soil samples.
• Scientists would like to study the chemical makeup of a meteorite that recently struck the Moon. Since landing
directly in the crater poses significant problems, they would like for you to land at this specific location (see
arrow). They believe this site is optimal for setting up a miniature experimental station.
• Scientists believe this crater field is home to vesicles, which are created from volcanic activity. They would like
you to check whether these vesicles exist. If they do, you will also harvest the gas escaping from them and lay
down the foundation for an experimental station.
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• Scientists believe the regolith located in this crater field is particularly rich with information about our solar
system, particularly, the Sun. They would like you to examine the isotopic composition of two lunar sites (see
arrows). Both are scientifically valuable. There is no preference between landing sites.
• Scientists would like you to investigate this region to determine whether these craters are a catena (crater chain).
Testing this hypothesis requires on-site measurements of the lunar soil chemical composition.
• Scientists would like you to set up a miniature experimental station at either one of these sites (see arrows). This
station will analyze the lunar soil for mineral deposits and track the amount of sunlight at this location. The
scientists will also need you to assist in equipment calibration.
B. Pre-briefing Questions
These questions were used to test the pilot’s readiness for the LPR simulator.
Use Figure 35a to answer Questions 1-5. (Short answer)
Symbols on this figure: green ellipse, striped purple circles, boxed number, blue dot, yellow circles, numbered green
circles, yellow tick marks, shaded red areas.
Use Figure 35b for Questions 6-8. (Multiple choice, short answer)
Use Figure 36 (behind this sheet) to answer Question 10.
1. Which symbol(s) describe area for which there is enough fuel?
2. Which symbol(s) indicate the point of interest?
3. How many landing options are available?
4. What do the purple striped circles represent?
5. What is the meaning of the shaded red areas?
6. What does the ”20” signify?
7. What is the slope margin of the site in Figure 2? Use the scale of:
• Safe - Far from Slope Threshold
• Tolerable - Tolerable Slope Threshold
• Warning - At Slope Threshold
8. What is the roughness margin of the site in Figure 35b? Use scale of:
• Safe - Far from Roughness Threshold
• Tolerable - Tolerable Roughness Threshold
• Warning - At Roughness Threshold
9. Assume you have selected to sort the landing sites with respect to fuel efficiency. You push the FUEL button.
What steps are now needed to select the second landing site as your final destination?
• Step One:
• Step Two:
10. Label the buttons along the bottom row using the following options: Button Names(Alphabetical Order): 1, 2,












(a) Use for Questions 1-5. (b) Use for Questions 6-8.
Figure 35: Figures for Preliminary Questions
C. Debriefing Questions
Questions in quotations were asked of the pilot.
1. “Your recent run had [describe scenario]. These were the actions you took to land the vehicle [hand printed
sheet for one of the runs]. Can you please explain why you selected this objective change?”
2. “Your recent run had [describe scenario]. These were the actions you took to land the vehicle [hand printed
sheet for a second run]. Can you please explain why you selected this objective change?”
3. “Your recent run had [describe scenario]. These were the actions you took to land the vehicle [hand printed
sheet for a third run]. Can you please explain why you selected this objective change?”
4. “If you were training another pilot to complete this task, what universal strategy would you suggest to them?
Can you draw a flow chart?”
5. “Please list the decision attributes you were considering in selecting your final landing site.” (examples: safety,
specific rock formations, etc).”
6. Please draw a flow chart describing what strategy other pilots should use to complete the landing point redesig-
nation task.
7. (Present Figure 37) “What types of information did you use to reach your decision? Please highlight and explain
why.”
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Figure 36: Use for Question 10.
Figure 37: Types of symbols used.
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8. “How useful was your window view?” (check all that apply)
• Not useful: I believe the window distracted me from the task.
• Not useful: I believe the window did not provide me the right information.
• Partly useful: I glanced at the window once or twice, but relied mainly on the data presented to me.
• Partly useful: I found the window view and the terrain data presented to be about equal in terms of useful
information provided.
• Very useful: I did not rely on terrain data, but only on the window to make my decision.
• Other: please explain.
9. “Please rate the usefulness of the scale based on Figure 38.”
Figure 38: Modified Cooper-Harper Rating Scale.39
10. “What improvements would you suggest?”
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